1st Patriotic War 1812 Church of the Life-Giving Trinity on Sparrow Hills. The significance of the Decembrist movement
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Russian Emperor ALEXANDER I was born on December 12 (23), 1777 in St. Petersburg. The first-born of Grand Duke Pavel Petrovich (later Emperor Paul I) and Grand Duchess Maria Feodorovna.
Immediately after his birth, Alexander was taken from his parents by his grandmother, Empress Catherine II, who intended to raise him as an ideal sovereign, a successor to her work. On the recommendation of D. Diderot, the Swiss F.Ts. was invited to be Alexander’s teacher. La Harpe, a Republican by conviction. The Grand Duke grew up with a romantic belief in the ideals of the Enlightenment, sympathized with the Poles who lost their statehood after the partitions of Poland, sympathized with the Great French Revolution and was critical of the political system of the Russian autocracy. Catherine II made him read the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen and she herself explained its meaning to him. At the same time, in the last years of his grandmother’s reign, Alexander found more and more inconsistencies between her declared ideals and everyday political practice. He had to carefully hide his feelings, which contributed to the formation of such traits in Alexander as pretense and slyness. This was also reflected in the relationship with his father during a visit to his residence in Gatchina, where the spirit of military spirit and strict discipline reigned. Alexander constantly had to have, as it were, two masks: one for his grandmother, the other for his father. In 1793 he was married to Princess Louise of Baden (in Orthodoxy Elizaveta Alekseevna), who enjoyed the sympathy of Russian society, but was not loved by her husband.
Before her death, Catherine II intended to bequeath the throne to Alexander, bypassing her son, but her grandson did not agree to accept the throne.
After Paul's accession, Alexander's position became even more complicated, for he had to constantly prove his loyalty to the suspicious emperor. Alexander’s attitude towards his father’s policies was sharply critical. It was these sentiments of Alexander that contributed to his involvement in the conspiracy against Paul, but on the conditions that the conspirators would spare his father’s life and would only seek his abdication. The tragic events of March 11, 1801 seriously affected Alexander’s state of mind: he felt a sense of guilt for the death of his father until the end of his days.
Beginning of reforms
Alexander I ascended to the Russian throne intending to carry out a radical reform of the political system of Russia by creating a constitution that guaranteed personal freedom and civil rights to all subjects. He was aware that such a “revolution from above” would actually lead to the elimination of the autocracy, and if successful, he was ready to retire from power. Already in the first days after his accession, Alexander announced that he would rule Russia “according to the laws and heart” of Catherine II. On April 5, 1801, the Permanent Council was created - a legislative advisory body under the sovereign, which received the right to protest the actions and decrees of the tsar. In May of the same year, Alexander submitted to the council a draft decree banning the sale of peasants without land, but members of the Council made it clear to the emperor that the adoption of such a decree would cause unrest among the nobles and lead to a new coup d'etat. After this, Alexander concentrated his efforts on developing reform among his “young friends” (V.P. Kochubey, A.A. Chartorysky, P.A. Stroganov, N.N. Novosiltsev). During the discussion of the projects, sharp contradictions between the members of the Permanent Council were revealed, and as a result, not a single one of the projects was made public. It was only announced that the distribution of state peasants to private hands would cease. Further consideration of the peasant question led to the appearance on February 20, 1803 of a decree on “free cultivators”, which allowed landowners to set free peasants and assign ownership of the land to them, which for the first time created the category of personally free peasants. At the same time, Alexander carried out administrative and educational reforms.
Gradually, Alexander began to get a taste of power and began to find advantages in autocratic rule. Disappointment in his immediate circle forced him to seek support in people who were personally loyal to him and not associated with the dignitary aristocracy. He first brings closer A. A. Arakcheev, and later M. B. Barclay de Tolly, who became Minister of War in 1810, and M. M. Speransky, to whom Alexander entrusted the development of a new project for state reform. Speransky's project envisioned the actual transformation of Russia into a constitutional monarchy, where the power of the sovereign would be limited by a bicameral legislative body of a parliamentary type. The implementation of Speransky's plan began in 1809, when the practice of equating court ranks with civilian ones was abolished and an educational qualification for civil officials was introduced. On January 1, 1810, the State Council was established, replacing the Indispensable Council. During 1810-11, the plans for financial, ministerial and senate reforms proposed by Speransky were discussed in the State Council. The implementation of the first of them led to a reduction in the budget deficit, and by the summer of 1811 the transformation of ministries was completed. Meanwhile, Alexander himself experienced intense pressure from his court circles, including members of his family, who sought to prevent radical reforms. The factor of Russia’s international position was also of no small importance: the increasing tension in relations with France and the need to prepare for war made it possible for the opposition to interpret Speransky’s reform activities as anti-state, and to declare Speransky himself a Napoleonic spy. All this led to the fact that Alexander, who was prone to compromise, although he did not believe in Speransky’s guilt, dismissed him in March 1812. 
Foreign policy
Having come to power, Alexander tried to pursue his foreign policy as if from a “clean slate.” The new Russian government sought to create a system of collective security in Europe, linking all the leading powers with a series of treaties. However, already in 1803, peace with France turned out to be unprofitable for Russia; in May 1804, the Russian side recalled its ambassador from France and began to prepare for a new war.
Alexander considered Napoleon a symbol of the violation of the legitimacy of the world order. But the Russian emperor overestimated his capabilities, which led to the disaster at Austerlitz in November 1805, and the presence of the emperor in the army and his inept orders had the most disastrous consequences. Alexander refused to ratify the peace treaty signed with France in June 1806, and only the defeat at Friedland in May 1807 forced the Russian emperor to agree. At his first meeting with Napoleon in Tilsit in June 1807, Alexander managed to prove himself an extraordinary diplomat and, according to some historians, actually “beat” Napoleon. An alliance and agreement was concluded between Russia and France on the division of zones of influence. As further developments of events showed, the Tilsit Agreement turned out to be more beneficial to Russia, allowing Russia to accumulate forces. Napoleon sincerely considered Russia his only possible ally in Europe. In 1808, the parties discussed plans for a joint campaign against India and the division of the Ottoman Empire. At a meeting with Alexander in Erfurt (September 1808), Napoleon recognized Russia's right to Finland, captured during the Russian-Swedish war (1808-09), and Russia recognized France's right to Spain. However, already at this time relations between the allies began to heat up due to the imperial interests of both sides. Thus, Russia was not satisfied with the existence of the Duchy of Warsaw, the continental blockade harmed the Russian economy, and in the Balkans each of the two countries had their own far-reaching plans. In 1810, Alexander refused Napoleon, who asked for the hand of his sister Grand Duchess Anna Pavlovna (later Queen of the Netherlands), and signed a provision on neutral trade, which effectively nullified the continental blockade. All this led to the fact that on June 12, 1812, French troops crossed the Russian border. The Patriotic War of 1812 began.
Patriotic War of 1812
The invasion of Napoleonic armies into Russia (which he learned about while in Vilna) was perceived by Alexander not only as the greatest threat to Russia, but also as a personal insult, and Napoleon himself henceforth became his mortal personal enemy. Not wanting to repeat the experience of Austerlitz, and submitting to pressure from his environment, Alexander left the army and returned to St. Petersburg. During the entire time that Barclay de Tolly carried out a retreat maneuver, which brought upon him the fire of sharp criticism from both society and the army, Alexander showed almost no solidarity with the military leader. After Smolensk was abandoned, the emperor yielded to everyone’s demands and appointed M.I. Kutuzov, whom the emperor disliked, to this post. With the expulsion of Napoleonic troops from Russia, Alexander returned to the army and was in it during the foreign campaigns of 1813-14, exposing himself, like everyone else, to the difficulties of camp life and the dangers of war. In particular, the emperor personally participated in the attack of the Russian cavalry at Fer-Champenoise, when Russian troops suddenly clashed with French ones.
Holy Alliance
The victory over Napoleon strengthened Alexander's authority; he became one of the most powerful rulers of Europe, who felt himself a liberator of its peoples, who was entrusted with a special mission, determined by God's will, to prevent further wars and devastation on the continent. He also considered the tranquility of Europe to be a necessary condition for the implementation of his reform plans in Russia itself. To ensure these conditions, it was necessary to maintain the status quo, determined by the decisions of the Congress of Vienna (1815), according to which the territory of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw was transferred to Russia, and the monarchy was restored in France, and Alexander insisted on the establishment of a constitutional-monarchical system in this country, which should was to serve as a precedent for the establishment of similar regimes in other countries. The Russian emperor, in particular, managed to enlist the support of his allies for his idea of introducing a constitution in Poland. As a guarantor of compliance with the decisions of the Congress of Vienna, the emperor initiated the creation of the Holy Alliance - the prototype of international organizations of the 20th century. Alexander was convinced that he owed his victory over Napoleon to the providence of God, his religiosity constantly intensified, and he gradually became a mystic.
Increased reaction
One of the paradoxes of Alexander’s domestic policy in the post-war period was the fact that attempts to renew the Russian state were accompanied by the establishment of a police regime, which later became known as “Arakcheevism.” Its symbol became military settlements, in which Alexander himself, however, saw one of the ways to liberate peasants from personal dependence, but which aroused hatred in the widest circles of society. In 1817, instead of the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Spiritual Affairs and Public Education was created, headed by the Chief Prosecutor of the Holy Synod and the head of the Bible Society A. N. Golitsyn. Under his leadership, the destruction of Russian universities was actually carried out, and cruel censorship reigned. In 1822, Alexander banned the activities of Masonic lodges and other secret societies in Russia and approved a Senate proposal that allowed landowners to exile their peasants to Siberia for “bad deeds.” At the same time, the emperor was aware of the activities of the first Decembrist organizations, but did not take any measures against their members, believing that they shared the delusions of his youth.
In the last years of his life, Alexander often told his loved ones about his intention to abdicate the throne and “retire from the world,” which, after his unexpected death from typhoid fever in Taganrog, gave rise to the legend of “elder Fyodor Kuzmich.” According to this legend, in Taganrog on November 19 (December 1), 1825, it was not Alexander who died and was then buried, but his double, while the tsar lived for a long time as an old hermit in Siberia and died in 1864. But there is no documentary evidence of this legend does not exist.
The Patriotic War of 1812 is an important page in the history of not only our country, but also the whole of Europe. Having entered a series of “Napoleonic wars,” Russia acted as the intercessor of monarchical Europe. Thanks to Russian victories over the French, the global revolution in Europe was delayed for some time.
War between France and Russia was inevitable, and on June 12, 1812, having gathered an army of 600 thousand, Napoleon crossed the Neman and invaded Russia. The Russian army had a plan to confront Napoleon, which was developed by the Prussian military theorist Fuhl, and approved by Emperor Alexander I.
Fuhl divided the Russian armies into three groups:
- 1st commanded;
- 2nd ;
- 3rd Tormasov.
Fuhl assumed that the armies would systematically retreat to fortified positions, unite, and hold back Napoleon’s onslaught. In practice, it was a disaster. Russian troops retreated, and soon the French found themselves not far from Moscow. Fuhl's plan completely failed, despite the desperate resistance of the Russian people.
The current situation required decisive action. So, on August 20, the post of commander-in-chief was taken by one of the best students of the Great. During the war with France, Kutuzov will utter an interesting phrase: “To save Russia, we must burn Moscow.”
Russian troops will give a general battle to the French near the village of Borodino. There was a Great Slaughter, called. No one emerged victorious. The battle was brutal, with many casualties on both sides. A few days later, at the military council in Fili, Kutuzov will decide to retreat. On September 2, the French entered Moscow. Napoleon hoped that Muscovites would bring him the key to the city. No matter how it is... Deserted Moscow did not greet Napoleon solemnly at all. The city burned down, barns with food and ammunition burned down.
Entering Moscow was fatal for Napoleon. He didn't really know what to do next. The French army was harassed by partisans every day, every night. The War of 1812 was truly a Patriotic War. Confusion and vacillation began in Napoleon's Army, discipline was broken, and the soldiers began to drink. Napoleon stayed in Moscow until October 7, 1812. The French army decided to retreat south, to grain-growing regions that were not devastated by the war.
The Russian army gave battle to the French at Maloyaroslavets. The city was mired in fierce fighting, but the French wavered. Napoleon was forced to retreat along the Old Smolensk Road, the same one along which he had come. The battles near Vyazma, Krasny and at the crossing of the Berezina put an end to the Napoleonic intervention. The Russian army drove the enemy from its land. On December 23, 1812, Alexander I issued a manifesto on the end of the Patriotic War. The Patriotic War of 1812 was over, but the campaign of the Napoleonic Wars was only in full swing. The fighting continued until 1814.
The Patriotic War of 1812 is an important event in Russian History. The war caused an unprecedented surge of national self-awareness among the Russian people. Everyone, young and old, defended their Fatherland. By winning this war, the Russian people confirmed their courage and heroism, and showed an example of self-sacrifice for the good of the Motherland. The war gave us many people whose names will be forever inscribed in Russian history, these are Mikhail Kutuzov, Dokhturov, Raevsky, Tormasov, Bagration, Seslavin, Gorchakov, Barclay-De-Tolly, . And how many still unknown heroes of the Patriotic War of 1812, how many forgotten names. The Patriotic War of 1812 is a Great Event, the lessons of which should not be forgotten today.
Who did Napoleon fight with? Why did Napoleon go to conquer Smolensk and Moscow, and not the capital - St. Petersburg?
Why was the uniform of Alexander the First's army very similar to the Great Napoleonic Army?
Did Napoleon really lose the War of 1812?
Why did the Russian elite speak French?
Maybe it was the Colonial Administration?
Serey Ignatenko about the War of 1812 - MUST WATCH (Before our stories are blocked)
Part 1
Part 2
Part 3
Part 4
Part 5
It is interesting that simultaneously with the war that began on June 22, 1812 in Russia, an equally mysterious war also began in North America on June 18, 1812, for which there will be a separate investigation (it, as if by chance, also ended in 1814).
The War of 1812 in Russia seems to be well described, even in overly obsessive detail, and all the attention of researchers is automatically concentrated on chewing on the details of the memoir literature about the battles. The official, well-established history of the War of 1812 in Russia seems smooth only at first glance, especially if knowledge is limited to two extremely publicized episodes, “the Battle of Borodino” and “the fire of Moscow.”
If we abstract from the strongly imposed point of view, for example, by imagining that there are no memoirs-witness testimony or we do not trust them, because “he is lying as an eyewitness” and check according to factual circumstances, then a completely unexpected picture is revealed:
As a result of the War of 1812 in Russia, the troops of Alexander I, in alliance with Napoleon I, conquered the territories of the Moscow-Smolensk Upland, or, figuratively speaking, “Petersburg defeated Muscovy.”
It has already been verified; for many, the first reaction of rejection is “the author is delusional.” When starting to test the hypothesis about false coverage in the official history of the goals of the War of 1812 in Russia, I myself was quite skeptical about it, but confirmations fell like a cornucopia, I don’t have time to describe them. Everything is slowly coming together into a completely logical picture, which is summarized on this index page. Links to a detailed description of the facts studied will appear as relevant articles are written.
Especially for those who are unable to read a multi-book, based on numerous requests, an explanation has been made on the fingers without fingers (I advise beginners not to rush to immediately follow the rest of the links, but first read the general picture presented below, otherwise you risk getting lost in a sea of information).
And those who are very experienced in history can try to clearly answer the simplest questions for themselves:
— why did Napoleon 1 go to conquer Smolensk and Moscow, and not the capital - St. Petersburg?
— why St. Petersburg, located “at the edge of the earth,” became the capital of the Russian Empire(big red dot), and not those marked in green are much more suitable for the capital status of the city (from left to right) Kyiv, Smolensk, Moscow, Yaroslavl, Nizhny Novgorod, Kazan?
Cities and seaports are indicated in red. Top left to right Riga, St. Petersburg, Arkhangelsk, bottom - Kherson and Rostov-on-Don
The real history of the Russian Empire becomes extremely clear, logical and easily understood if viewed from the right point of view, from the Baltic.
1. Let's start with well-known facts: the capital of the Russian Empire was St. Petersburg, the ruling dynasty was the Romanovs.
2. “Romanovs” is a local pseudonym for the Holstein-Gottorp branch of the Oldenburg dynasty, which ruled the Baltic Sea.
3. St. Petersburg was chosen by the Oldenburgs aka “Romanovs” as the capital as the most convenient springboard for penetration from the Baltic Sea into the Volga basin, isolated from all seas, in order to expand the sphere of their economic influence (see more details, part 1 motivational St. Petersburg stupid + part 2 basic Petersburg is irreplaceable ")
4. The main vector of the conquest and development of the territories of Russia by the Romanovs is directed from St. Petersburg (the Baltic Sea) into the interior of the continent, to the Volga basin along waterways, naturally in order to pump out useful resources from there. This part of the history of the phased conquests of the Romanovs was disguised as various “internal” events to create the illusion of long-standing possession (previous index page “E-2 Wars are noticeable”)
5. At the same time, additional vectors of the Romanovs’ actions were directed there, to the Volga basin, from the Black and Azov Seas. This part of history is well known as the continuous wars of the Romanovs with Turkey.
Now let's look at the situation before the War of 1812. During the time of Catherine 2, significant efforts had already been made to penetrate the Volga basin (see the page “E-2 Wars Notable”). And yet, at the beginning of the 19th century, St. Petersburg was categorically isolated from the Moscow-Smolensk Upland; there was not a single normal direct waterway (only the unsuccessful Vyshnevolotsk system, somehow working down to St. Petersburg). In those days, of course, there were no airplanes, no railways, no highways, only waterways along rivers and short land sections - “portages” between river routes. And if there are no normal routes of communication along which goods, troops, etc. can be moved, then there is no transport connectivity, without which there can be no statehood. Couriers with decrees can get there, but without the economic and security components, these decrees are worthless.
St. Petersburg, shortly before the war of 1812, had almost all the same waterways with land sections of “portages” that Novgorod merchants had long before the emergence of St. Petersburg:
That is why the Moscow-Smolensk Upland, located in the upper reaches of the Volga and Dnieper basins, at that time was almost entirely beyond the reach of St. Petersburg, which could be content with only the same food as ancient Novgorod.
The absence of direct waterways of communication is an objective, key point for understanding what was happening, a kind of “reverse alibi” for St. Petersburg - it had nothing to do with Moscow and Smolensk.
Skeptics can carefully examine the map of Europe from the very first edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica of 1771 and be convinced that Russia (Russia) is not Moscow Tartary (Muscovite Tartarie), which I call for brevity simply Muscovy or the Old Power; on the right, the toponyms of interest from this map are indicated on fragment of the Shokalsky map from the Brockhaus dictionary, the watershed of the Baltic river basins is highlighted with a red line (maps are clickable):
In other words, I don’t need to invent some new reality, I’m simply explaining why these territories used to be different states and how St. Petersburg The Oldenburg-“Romanovs” conquered Moscow Tartary, and then called their possessions the Russian Empire, that is, they extended the name Russia to the conquered land. There is nothing offensive in this (well, perhaps for those who consider themselves a descendant of the rulers of Tartary;-), on the contrary, the result was a very powerful state, so I personally have no complaints about the conquerors.
I repeat once again: to understand the ENTIRE history of the Russian Empire, it is very important to read: Part 1 Stupid Petersburg Petersburg is irreplaceable (why Petersburg is in this particular place and why it became the capital).
The main city controlling the transport hubs of the Moscow-Smolensk Upland at that time was the “key city” of Smolensk, located in the upper reaches of the Dnieper, where the chain of portages began, connecting the river routes “from the Varangians to the Greeks” and “from the Varangians to the Persians” at the intersection trade routes from the Dnieper, Western Dvina, Volkhov, Volga and Oka river basins.
A simple military conquest of the cities of the Moscow-Smolensk Upland without including them in the zone of economic interests is meaningless, and therefore preparations for war began at the turn of the 18th-19th centuries with the large-scale construction of direct waterways from St. Petersburg to the Volga: Mariinskaya, Tikhvinskaya and reconstruction of the Vyshnevolotskaya water systems. The construction of the Berezinsk water system ensured the capture of both the trade flows of Smolensk and the city itself. Naturally, the war began only when the listed routes for the invasion of troops were ready, as we have to see for ourselves.
The directions of movement of the Oldenburgs in the Baltic are indicated in red. Blue - the main rivers of the European part of Russia. Green - direct waterways formed after the construction of the St. Petersburg Oldenburgs (“Romanovs”) water systems (from left to right, bottom to top): Berezinskaya, Vyshnevolotskaya, Tikhvinskaya, Mariinskaya:
Simultaneously with the construction of direct waterways, other large-scale and thorough preparations for military invasion and post-war development of the occupied territory were carried out:
In 1803, the task of ideological preparation for a future war was set in advance: the creation of a new history of the conquered territories was entrusted to N. Karamzin, who was appointed by a personal decree as a “Russian historiographer” (such a position had never existed before or after Karamzin). Also in 1803, a decision was made to create a monument to the victors (responsible - Comrade Martos).
1804, June - the introduction of preliminary censorship, it was forbidden to print, distribute and sell anything without the consideration and approval of the censorship authorities. via
1804-1807 — the Horse Guards Manege is being built in St. Petersburg for all-season and all-weather training of riders via
In 1805, as a first approximation, the Berezina water system was completed, connecting the Western Dvina with the Dnieper tributary the Berezina River in the Vitebsk region. A continuous waterway appeared “from the Varangians to the Greeks” from the Baltic Sea up the Western Dvina (Daugava), then through the locks of the Berezina system down the Berezina River to the Dnieper and further down its course into the Black Sea.
1805 - unification of artillery - “Arakcheevskaya” system via
1807 - Alexander and Napoleon in Tilsit sign a peace treaty and a secret one on an offensive and defensive alliance. The famous top-secret negotiations of the two emperors strictly alone on a raft in the middle of the Neman.
1808 – Another meeting between Alexander and Napoleon took place in Erfurt, where a secret convention was signed.
1809 - Prince George of Oldenburg, who arrived from England, heads the “Water Communications Expedition”, which together with him moves from St. Petersburg as close as possible to Muscovy - to Tver, which Alexander called “our third capital”. To serve in the expedition, a “corps of engineers” was established under martial law. A special “Police Team” was assigned to streamline shipping and supervise it. On the Tvertsa River, the construction of a towpath for the movement of barge haulers was completed, and the deepening of the Ladoga Canal began, the Vyshnevolotsk system was brought into working order in both directions. Karamzin periodically in Tver reads to Prince George of Oldenburg the “History of the Russian State” he created.
In 1809, the aforementioned Institute of Railway Corps Engineers was opened in Russia. Its first release took place in 1812; One group of graduates voluntarily went to combat units, and 12 people went to the disposal of the commander-in-chief of the armies. Thus, already at the beginning of the 1812 campaign, engineers from the Communications Corps were seconded to the field army, and military engineering troops were actually created, which for some reason had not been needed before. ()
In 1809-1812 In St. Petersburg, 5 albums for standard construction are published: “A collection of facades, highly approved by His Imperial Majesty for private buildings in the cities of the Russian Empire.” All five albums contained about 200 residential, commercial, industrial, commercial and other buildings and over 70 projects for fences and gates. Only one principle was strictly followed: to maintain the constant stylistic unity of all the buildings included in the albums. via
Since 1810, on the instructions of Alexander I, the Arakcheevs have been testing the technology of organizing military settlements on the principle of the Prussian Landwehr, which will be required in the future during the colonization of occupied lands - the troops remain to live in the occupied territory, which solves several problems at once: there is no need to solve the problems of their removal and subsequent deployment , the troops are at least self-sufficient, maintain order, the natural loss of men during the war is replenished, etc. “Military settlements are a system of organizing troops in Russia in 1810-1857, combining military service with productive labor, primarily agricultural.” via
about the military settlements of Arakcheev from the magazine “World Illustration” of 1871.
Also in 1810, an independent government department was created - the Main Directorate of Spiritual Affairs of Various (Foreign) Denominations with the rights to create or liquidate churches, appoint heads of monastic orders, approve heads of confessions, etc. via
1810 – The Mariinskaya water system began to operate. From 1810 to 1812, an additional reconstruction of the Berezinsk water system was carried out under the leadership of the famous engineer Devolant.
From 1810 to 1812, by order of Alexander 1, two new, most modern fortresses were built with incredible speed - Dinaburg on the Western Dvina and Bobruisk on the Berezina, the existing fortress at the mouth of the Dvina - Dynamunde was modernized, all fortresses on the Western Dvina - Dnieper waterway were well armed, replenished with ammunition and food supplies.
1811 - the Ministry of Police is created, among its powers is “censorship control” - supervision of the censorship committee and publications already allowed for printing and distribution, i.e. censorship has become double. To avoid terminological confusion, it should be clarified that the Ministry of Internal Affairs, created in 1802, belonged to the economic department, the main task of which was the development of industry, agriculture, internal trade, post office, construction and maintenance of public buildings. During the War of 1812 and subsequent hostilities of 1813–1814, the Ministry of Police was entrusted with the tasks of providing the army with food (!?), conducting recruitment drives and forming a militia, and the Ministry of the Interior organized the supply of uniforms and equipment to the troops. via
1811 - To restore order after the war in the vast occupied territories, Alexander 1, for the first time in world history, creates a special organization “Internal Guard Corps” with the tasks of escorting prisoners and arrestees, eliminating mass riots, and for the first time in history, the use of weapons against the civilian population is legally regulated . This corps, being part of the army, simultaneously carried out the orders of the Minister of Police. Functionally, the “Internal Guard Corps” corresponds to the modern Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
1811 – the Tikhvin water system was put into operation
By 1812, the reconstruction of the Berezinsky water system was completed and from that moment all waterways were ready for the invading army.
The most important figure of silence: the sea and river fleet in the war of 1812, about the actions of which there is shockingly scant information, although the effective movement of troops and supplies between the chain of fortresses on the Western Dvina - Berezina system - Dnieper waterway could only be provided by water transport: A huge river invasion fleet was discovered in the War of 1812
Expressing the importance of the fleet in war, the First Lord of the English Admiralty, Sir John Fisher, considered the land army just as a projectile, a cannonball fired at the enemy by the fleet. In contrast, the prevailing stereotype of the War of 1812 in Russia depicts only land battles, cavalry, wagons and infantry. It turns out something like this: since Leo Tolstoy did not write about the fleet, therefore the fleet did not exist in 1812... One gets the impression that the mention of the fleet and any water transport was prohibited by censorship.
1812, May - Kutuzov signed a peace treaty with Turkey, the southern group of troops was freed, now everything is ready for the invasion of Muscovy, the troops begin to move towards Smolensk.
1812, June - Napoleon's troops arrive on the Neman, Alexander is waiting for him in Vilna, part of Alexander's troops have already arrived by water from St. Petersburg.
1812 - Napoleon’s troops, instead of immediately rushing along the shortest strategic corridor along the sea to St. Petersburg, which was “defended” by one infantry corps of Wittgenstein, it is now clear why they prefer to move together in a “wake column” after Alexander’s troops.
1812, August - all the troops of both Alexander and Napoleon, strictly according to schedule, united near Smolensk, which was a key point on the route “from the Varangians to the Greeks.”
The Battle of Smolensk generally receives little attention, although an elementary question arises - why at Borodino, in an open field, “Bagration’s flashes” were built, and here the defense is held by a fortress built even under Boris Godunov, but “neither the walls nor the fortifications had the necessary fortifications to accommodate artillery, so defensive battles took place mainly in the suburbs.” By the way, it was after Smolensk that Kutuzov came out of the shadow, who for some reason suddenly received the title of His Serene Highness Prince of Smolensk, although according to the official version at that time he was in charge of recruiting the people’s militia (a very worthy occupation for a military leader of such a rank;-). (See: Some mysteries of Smolensk in 1812 and Why is Kutuzov the Prince of Smolensk and not Borodino?)
The Battle of Borodino, which at first was perceived by me as some kind of artificially created symbol and the world’s first museum of historical reconstruction, formed on the initiative of Emperor Nicholas 1 in 1839, unexpectedly turned out to be a truly important event at the fork in the waterways. see “Borodino. Oddities and mysteries of the battle."
Instead of using the maps of historians, helpfully drawn with arrows, we can put only the battle sites on a blank map, as the main reliably established facts, then we will see a completely clear turn traces of blood exactly after Borodino to the south, to Kaluga:
“Fire in Moscow” is the second extremely publicized virtual an episode of the war (see Comic-thriller “The Great Virtual Fire of Moscow of 1812”) to explain the 30-year construction (supposedly “restoration”) that followed the war, because from the point of view of waterways at that time there could be nothing significant there, but from the point of view of overland highway and railway communications in a straight line from St. Petersburg necessarily through Tver, then greater Moscow had to be built in this very place:
If we argue from the point of view of classical history that it was opponents and not allies who fought, then after the withdrawal of Alexander 1’s troops to the south, towards Kaluga, Napoleon had a Second Strategic Chance, in my opinion the only one in world history when it was possible to capture three at once capitals: the “old capital” Moscow, the “third capital” Tver and the “new capital” St. Petersburg! But we now understand why Napoleon did not do this, but, according to a pre-planned plan, followed Alexander’s troops in order to jointly crush the remnants of Muscovy’s troops in the upper reaches of the Oka basin. (see “Why Napoleon didn’t go to ... “).
“The Flight of Napoleon’s Army” is the third heavily promoted virtual a large episode of the war is made as follows: the real battles marked on the previously shown diagram are dated “dashed line, one after another” - part during the period of offensive, and part during the period of supposed “retreat”, so that not even a shadow of the thought arises that the occupying army conquered and remained. Mass death from frost and other factors seems to write off a greatly inflated number, that is, at the same time answers are given to the question: “Where did such a huge army of Napoleon go if it did not return to Europe.” Here “Peace death of Napoleon's army” examines the visualization of the decline of the army according to the testimony of memoirists. Anyone who is not lazy can read various memoirs regarding the chosen city and marvel at how much they are “confused in the testimony”, it is clear that the method for writing memoirs was corrected several times, or the “eyewitness memoirists” were inattentive, but this is imperceptible to the general reader, he also perceives generalized stories in school textbooks and does not doubt the reliability of the primary sources of his knowledge.
1812, November 14 - The highest rescript of Emperor Alexander I on the search by specially authorized military officials for abandoned and hidden weapons and property in those territories where military operations were taking place. From the 875 artillery pieces found and brought to Moscow by January 10, 1819, the symbolic stupid Tsar Bell and so on were cast. (see “The Moscow Tsar Bell was cast in the 19th century”)
1812, December 6 - following the results of the war in Muscovy, Kutuzov was given the title “Smolensky”. December 25 - formally and symbolically on Christmas Day, the war is over, Napoleon, practically without troops, supposedly goes home, although in fact the occupation troops remained to clear the area and form military settlements. Alexander issues a decree on the construction of the Cathedral of Christ the Savior (the first temple in history dedicated specifically to Christ!)
1813, January - a branch of the British Bible Society is created in St. Petersburg, renamed in 1814 as the Russian Bible Society. The official task is to translate the Bible into the languages of the peoples (wasn’t it important before?), the total circulation of published books is at least half a million copies. The most interesting thing is that the Bible was eventually translated into ordinary Russian only at the end of the 19th century. What were they really doing there?
The fire of European wars increasingly engulfed Europe. At the beginning of the 19th century, Russia was also involved in this struggle. The result of this intervention was the unsuccessful foreign wars with Napoleon and the Patriotic War of 1812.
Causes of the war
After the defeat of the Fourth Anti-French Coalition by Napoleon on June 25, 1807, the Treaty of Tilsit was concluded between France and Russia. The conclusion of peace forced Russia to join the participants in the continental blockade of England. However, neither country was going to comply with the terms of the treaty.
The main causes of the War of 1812:
- The Peace of Tilsit was economically unprofitable for Russia, so the government of Alexander I decided to trade with England through neutral countries.
- The policy pursued by Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte towards Prussia was to the detriment of Russian interests; French troops concentrated on the border with Russia, also contrary to the provisions of the Tilsit Treaty.
- After Alexander I did not agree to give his consent to the marriage of his sister Anna Pavlovna with Napoleon, relations between Russia and France deteriorated sharply.
At the end of 1811, the bulk of the Russian army was deployed against the war with Turkey. By May 1812, thanks to the genius of M.I. Kutuzov, the military conflict was resolved. Türkiye curtailed its military expansion in the East, and Serbia gained independence.
Beginning of the war
By the beginning of the Great Patriotic War of 1812-1814, Napoleon managed to concentrate up to 645 thousand troops on the border with Russia. His army included Prussian, Spanish, Italian, Dutch and Polish units.
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The Russian troops, despite all the objections of the generals, were divided into three armies and located far from each other. The first army under the command of Barclay de Tolly numbered 127 thousand people, the second army, led by Bagration, had 49 thousand bayonets and sabers. And finally, in the third army of General Tormasov, there were about 45 thousand soldiers.
Napoleon decided to immediately take advantage of the mistake of the Russian emperor, namely, with a sudden blow to defeat the two main armies of Barclay de Toll and Bagration in border battles, preventing them from uniting and moving with an accelerated march to defenseless Moscow.
At five in the morning on June 12, 1821, the French army (about 647 thousand) began to cross the Russian border.
Rice. 1. Crossing of Napoleonic troops across the Neman.
The numerical superiority of the French army allowed Napoleon to immediately take the military initiative into his own hands. The Russian army did not yet have universal conscription and the army was replenished through outdated recruitment kits. Alexander I, who was in Polotsk, issued a Manifesto on July 6, 1812 calling for the collection of a general people's militia. As a result of the timely implementation of such internal policy by Alexander I, different layers of the Russian population began to rapidly flock to the ranks of the militia. Nobles were allowed to arm their serfs and join the ranks of the regular army with them. The war immediately began to be called “Patriotic”. The manifesto also regulated the partisan movement.
Progress of military operations. Main events
The strategic situation required the immediate merging of the two Russian armies into a single whole under a common command. Napoleon’s task was the opposite - to prevent Russian forces from uniting and to defeat them as quickly as possible in two or three border battles.
The following table shows the course of the main chronological events of the Patriotic War of 1812:
| date | Event | Content |
| June 12, 1812 | Invasion of Napoleon's troops into the Russian Empire |
|
| June 27-28, 1812 | Clashes near the town of Mir |
|
| July 11, 1812 | Battle of Saltanovka |
|
| July 25-28, 1812 | Battle near Vitebsk |
|
| July 27, 1812 | Battle of Kovrin |
|
| July 29-August 1, 1812 | Battle of Klyastitsy |
|
| August 16-18, 1812 | Battle for Smolensk |
|
| August 18, 1812 | Kutuzov arrived in the village of Tsarevo-Zaimishche |
|
| August 19, 1812 | Battle at Valutina Mountain |
|
| August 24-26 | battle of Borodino |
|
| September 13, 1812 | Council in Fili |
|
| September 14-October 20, 1812 | Occupation of Moscow by the French |
|
| October 18, 1812 | Tarutino fight |
|
| October 24, 1812 | Battle of Maloyaroslavets |
|
| November 9, 1812 | Battle of Lyakhov |
|
| November 15, 1812 | Battle of Krasny |
|
| November 26-29, 1812 | Crossing at the Berezina |
|
Rice. 2. Crossing of French troops across the Berezina. Januariy Zlatopolsky...
Napoleon's invasion caused enormous damage to the Russian Empire - many cities were burned, tens of thousands of villages were reduced to ashes. But common misfortune brings people together. An unprecedented scale of patriotism united the central provinces, tens of thousands of peasants signed up for the militia, went into the forest, becoming partisans. Not only men, but also women fought the French, one of them was Vasilisa Kozhina.
The defeat of France and the results of the War of 1812
After the victory over Napoleon, Russia continued to liberate European countries from the yoke of the French invaders. In 1813, a military alliance was concluded between Prussia and Russia. The first stage of the foreign campaigns of Russian troops against Napoleon ended in failure due to the sudden death of Kutuzov and the lack of coordination in the actions of the allies.
- However, France was extremely exhausted by continuous wars and asked for peace. However, Napoleon lost the fight on the diplomatic front. Another coalition of powers grew up against France: Russia, Prussia, England, Austria and Sweden.
- In October 1813, the famous Battle of Leipzig took place. At the beginning of 1814, Russian troops and allies entered PARIS. Napoleon was deposed and at the beginning of 1814 exiled to the island of Elba.
Rice. 3. Entry of Russian and allied troops into Paris. HELL. Kivshenko.
- In 1814, a Congress was held in Vienna, where the victorious countries discussed questions about the post-war structure of Europe.
- In June 1815, Napoleon fled the island of Elba and retook the French throne, but after just 100 days of rule, the French were defeated at the Battle of Waterloo. Napoleon was exiled to Saint Helena.
Summing up the results of the Patriotic War of 1812, it should be noted that the influence it had on the leading people of Russian society was limitless. Based on this war, great writers and poets wrote many great works. The post-war peace was short-lived, although the Congress of Vienna gave Europe several years of peace. Russia acted as the savior of occupied Europe, but Western historians tend to underestimate the historical significance of the Patriotic War.
What have we learned?
The beginning of the 19th century in the history of Russia, studied in grade 4, was marked by a bloody war with Napoleon. A detailed report and table “Patriotic War of 1812” tells briefly about the Patriotic War of 1812, what the nature of this war was, the main periods of military operations.
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Russia's war for freedom and independence against the aggression of France and its allies.
It was a consequence of deep political contradictions between the France of Emperor Napoleon I Bonaparte, which sought European dominance, and the Russian Empire, which opposed its political and territorial claims.
On the French side, the war was of a coalition nature. The Confederation of the Rhine alone supplied 150 thousand people to Napoleonic army. Eight army corps were composed of foreign contingents. In the Great Army there were about 72 thousand Poles, over 36 thousand Prussians, about 31 thousand Austrians, and a significant number of representatives of other European states. The total strength of the French army was about 1200 thousand people. More than half of it was intended for the invasion of Russia.
By June 1, 1812, Napoleonic invasion forces included the Imperial Guard, 12 infantry corps, cavalry reserve (4 corps), artillery and engineering parks - a total of 678 thousand people and about 2.8 thousand guns.
Napoleon I used the Duchy of Warsaw as a springboard for the attack. His strategic plan was to quickly defeat the main forces of the Russian army in a general battle, capture Moscow and impose a peace treaty on the Russian Empire on French terms. The enemy invasion forces were deployed in 2 echelons. The 1st echelon consisted of 3 groups (total 444 thousand people, 940 guns), located between the Neman and Vistula rivers. The 1st group (left wing troops, 218 thousand people, 527 guns) under the direct command of Napoleon I concentrated on the line Elbing (now Elblag), Thorn (now Torun) for an offensive through Kovno (now Kaunas) to Vilna (now Vilnius) . The 2nd group (general E. Beauharnais; 82 thousand people, 208 guns) was intended to attack in the zone between Grodno and Kovno with the aim of separating the Russian 1st and 2nd Western armies. The 3rd group (under the command of the brother of Napoleon I - J. Bonaparte; troops of the right wing, 78 thousand people, 159 guns) had the task of moving from Warsaw to Grodno to pull back the Russian 2nd Western Army to facilitate the offensive of the main forces . These troops were supposed to encircle and destroy piece by piece the Russian 1st and 2nd Western armies with sweeping blows. On the left wing, the invasion of the 1st group of troops was supported by the Prussian corps (32 thousand people) of Marshal J. MacDonald. On the right wing, the invasion of the 3rd group of troops was supported by the Austrian corps (34 thousand people) of Field Marshal K. Schwarzenberg. In the rear, between the Vistula and Oder rivers, there remained the troops of the 2nd echelon (170 thousand people, 432 guns) and the reserve (the corps of Marshal P. Augereau and other troops).
After a series of anti-Napoleonic wars, the Russian Empire remained in international isolation by the beginning of the Patriotic War, also experiencing financial and economic difficulties. In the two pre-war years, its expenses for the needs of the army amounted to more than half of the state budget. Russian troops on the western borders had about 220 thousand people and 942 guns. They were deployed in 3 groups: the 1st Ignite Army (infantry general; 6 infantry, 2 cavalry and 1 Cossack corps; about 128 thousand people, 558 guns) constituted the main forces and was located between Rossieny (now Raseiniai, Lithuania) and Lida; The 2nd Western Army (infantry general; 2 infantry, 1 cavalry corps and 9 Cossack regiments; about 49 thousand people, 216 guns) concentrated between the Neman and Bug rivers; The 3rd Western Army (cavalry general A.P. Tormasov; 3 infantry, 1 cavalry corps and 9 Cossack regiments; 43 thousand people, 168 guns) was stationed in the Lutsk area. In the Riga area there was a separate corps (18.5 thousand people) of Lieutenant General I. N. Essen. The nearest reserves (the corps of Lieutenant General P.I. Meller-Zakomelsky and Lieutenant General F.F. Ertel) were located in the areas of the cities of Toropets and Mozyr. In the south, in Podolia, the Danube Army (about 30 thousand people) of Admiral P.V. Chichagov was concentrated. The leadership of all armies was carried out by the emperor, who was with his main apartment at the 1st Western Army. The commander-in-chief was not appointed, but Barclay de Tolly, being the Minister of War, had the right to give orders on behalf of the emperor. The Russian armies stretched out on a front stretching over 600 km, and the main forces of the enemy - 300 km. This put Russian troops in a difficult position. By the beginning of the enemy invasion, Alexander I accepted the plan proposed by his military adviser, the Prussian general K. Fuhl. According to his plan, the 1st Western Army, having retreated from the border, was supposed to take refuge in a fortified camp, and the 2nd Western Army would go to the flank and rear of the enemy.
According to the nature of military events in the Patriotic War, 2 periods are distinguished. The 1st period - from the invasion of French troops on June 12 (24) to October 5 (17) - includes defensive actions, the Tarutino flank march-maneuver of Russian troops, their preparation for the offensive and guerrilla operations on enemy communications. 2nd period - from the transition of the Russian army to a counteroffensive on October 6 (18) to the defeat of the enemy and the complete liberation of Russian land on December 14 (26).
The pretext for the attack on the Russian Empire was Alexander I’s alleged violation of the main, in the opinion of Napoleon I, provision - “to be in an eternal alliance with France and in the war with England,” which manifested itself in the sabotage of the continental blockade by the Russian Empire. On June 10 (22), Napoleon I, through the ambassador in St. Petersburg J. A. Lauriston, officially declared war on Russia, and on June 12 (24), the French army began crossing the Neman across 4 bridges (near Kovno and other cities). Having received news of the invasion of French troops, Alexander I attempted to resolve the conflict peacefully, calling on the French emperor to “withdraw his troops from Russian territory.” However, Napoleon I rejected this proposal.
Under pressure from superior enemy forces, the 1st and 2nd Western armies began to retreat into the interior of the country. The 1st Western Army left Vilna and retreated to the Drissa camp (near the city of Drissa, now Verhnedvinsk, Belarus), increasing the gap with the 2nd Western Army to 200 km. The main enemy forces rushed into it on June 26 (July 8), occupying Minsk and creating the threat of defeating the Russian armies one by one. The 1st and 2nd Western Armies, intending to unite, retreated in converging directions: the 1st Western Army from Drissa through Polotsk to Vitebsk (to cover the St. Petersburg direction, the corps of Lieutenant General, from November General of Infantry P.Kh. Wittgenstein), and the 2nd Western Army from Slonim to Nesvizh, Bobruisk, Mstislavl.
The war shook up the entire Russian society: peasants, merchants, commoners. By mid-summer, self-defense units began to spontaneously form in the occupied territory to protect their villages from French raids. foragers and marauders (see Looting). Having assessed the significance, the Russian military command took measures to expand and organize it. For this purpose, army partisan detachments were created in the 1st and 2nd Western armies on the basis of regular troops. In addition, according to the manifesto of Emperor Alexander I of July 6 (18), recruitment into the people's militia was carried out in Central Russia and the Volga region. Its creation, recruitment, financing and supply were led by the Special Committee. The Orthodox Church made a significant contribution to the fight against foreign invaders, calling on the people to protect their state and religious shrines, collecting about 2.5 million rubles for the needs of the Russian army (from the church treasury and as a result of donations from parishioners).
On July 8 (20), the French occupied Mogilev and did not allow the Russian armies to unite in the Orsha region. Only thanks to persistent rearguard battles and maneuver did the Russian armies unite near Smolensk on July 22 (August 3). By this time, Wittgenstein’s corps had retreated to a line north of Polotsk and, having pinned down the enemy’s forces, weakened his main group. The 3rd Western Army, after the battles on July 15 (27) near Kobrin, and on July 31 (August 12) near Gorodechnaya (now both cities are in the Brest region, Belarus), where it inflicted great damage on the enemy, defended itself on the river. Styr.
The beginning of the war upset the strategic plan of Napoleon I. The Grand Army lost up to 150 thousand people killed, wounded, sick and deserters. Its combat effectiveness and discipline began to decline, and the pace of the offensive slowed down. On July 17 (29), Napoleon I was forced to give the order to stop his army for 7-8 days in the area from Velizh to Mogilev to rest and await the arrival of reserves and rear forces. Submitting to the will of Alexander I, who demanded active action, the military council of the 1st and 2nd Western armies decided to take advantage of the dispersed position of the enemy and break the front of his main forces with a counterattack in the direction of Rudnya and Porechye (now the city of Demidov). On July 26 (August 7), Russian troops launched a counteroffensive, but due to poor organization and lack of coordination, it did not bring the expected results. Napoleon I used the battles that ensued near Rudnya and Porechye to suddenly transport his troops across the Dnieper, threatening to capture Smolensk. The troops of the 1st and 2nd Western armies began to retreat to Smolensk in order to reach the Moscow road before the enemy. During the Battle of Smolensk in 1812, the Russian armies, through active defense and skillful maneuver of reserves, managed to avoid a general battle imposed by Napoleon I in unfavorable conditions and on the night of August 6 (18) retreat to Dorogobuzh. The enemy continued to advance on Moscow.
The length of the retreat caused grumbling among the soldiers and officers of the Russian army and general discontent in Russian society. The departure from Smolensk exacerbated hostile relations between P. I. Bagration and M. B. Barclay de Tolly. This forced Alexander I to establish the post of commander-in-chief of all active Russian armies and appoint to it the infantry general (from August 19 (31) Field Marshal General) M. I. Kutuzov, the head of the St. Petersburg and Moscow militias. Kutuzov arrived in the army on August 17 (29) and took over the main command.
Having found a position near Tsarev Zaymishcha (now a village in the Vyazemsky district of the Smolensk region), where Barclay de Tolly on August 19 (31) intended to give the enemy a battle that was unfavorable and the army’s forces were insufficient, Kutuzov withdrew his troops to several crossings to the east and stopped in front of Mozhaisk, near the village Borodino, on a field that made it possible to position troops advantageously and block the Old and New Smolensk roads. The arriving reserves under the command of the general from infantry, the Moscow and Smolensk militias made it possible to increase the forces of the Russian army to 132 thousand people and 624 guns. Napoleon I had a force of about 135 thousand people and 587 guns. Neither side achieved its goals: Napoleon I was unable to defeat the Russian army, Kutuzov was unable to block the path of the Great Army to Moscow. The Napoleonic army, having lost about 50 thousand people (according to French data, over 30 thousand people) and most of the cavalry, turned out to be seriously weakened. Kutuzov, having received information about the losses of the Russian army (44 thousand people), refused to continue the battle and gave the order to retreat.
By retreating to Moscow, he hoped to partially make up for the losses suffered and fight a new battle. But the position chosen by cavalry general L.L. Bennigsen near the walls of Moscow turned out to be extremely unfavorable. Taking into account that the first actions of the partisans showed high efficiency, Kutuzov ordered to take them under the control of the General Staff of the field army, entrusting their leadership to the duty general of staff, General-L. P. P. Konovnitsyna. At a military council in the village of Fili (now within the boundaries of Moscow) on September 1 (13), Kutuzov ordered to leave Moscow without a fight. Most of the population left the city along with the troops. On the very first day the French entered Moscow, fires began, lasting until September 8 (20) and devastating the city. While the French were in Moscow, partisan detachments surrounded the city in an almost continuous mobile ring, not allowing enemy foragers to move further than 15-30 km from it. The most active were the actions of the army partisan detachments, I. S. Dorokhov, A. N. Seslavin and A. S. Figner.
Leaving Moscow, Russian troops retreated along the Ryazan road. After walking 30 km, they crossed the Moscow River and turned west. Then, with a forced march, they crossed to the Tula road and on September 6 (18) concentrated in the Podolsk area. After 3 days they were already on the Kaluga road and on September 9 (21) they stopped at a camp near the village of Krasnaya Pakhra (since July 1, 2012, within Moscow). Having completed 2 more transitions, Russian troops concentrated on September 21 (October 3) near the village of Tarutino (now a village in the Zhukovsky district of the Kaluga region). As a result of a skillfully organized and executed marching maneuver, they broke away from the enemy and took up an advantageous position for a counterattack.
The active participation of the population in the partisan movement turned the war from a confrontation between regular armies into a people's war. The main forces of the Great Army and all its communications from Moscow to Smolensk were under the threat of attacks from Russian troops. The French lost their freedom of maneuver and activity. The routes to the provinces south of Moscow that were not devastated by the war were closed to them. The “small war” launched by Kutuzov further complicated the enemy’s position. Bold operations of army and peasant partisan detachments disrupted the supply of French troops. Realizing the critical situation, Napoleon I sent General J. Lauriston to the headquarters of the Russian commander-in-chief with peace proposals addressed to Alexander I. Kutuzov rejected them, saying that the war was just beginning and would not stop until the enemy was completely expelled from Russia.
The Russian army located in the Tarutino camp reliably covered the south of the country: Kaluga with military reserves concentrated there, Tula and Bryansk with weapons and foundries. At the same time, reliable communications were ensured with the 3rd Western and Danube armies. In the Tarutino camp, the troops were reorganized, re-equipped (their number was increased to 120 thousand people), and supplied with weapons, ammunition and food. There was now 2 times more artillery than the enemy, and 3.5 times more cavalry. The provincial militia numbered 100 thousand people. They covered Moscow in a semicircle along the line Klin, Kolomna, Aleksin. Under Tarutin, M.I. Kutuzov developed a plan for encircling and defeating the Great Army in the area between the Western Dvina and Dnieper rivers with the main forces of the active army, the Danube Army of P.V. Chichagov and the corps of P.H. Wittgenstein.
The first blow was struck on October 6 (18) against the vanguard of the French army on the Chernishnya River (Battle of Tarutino 1812). The troops of Marshal I. Murat lost 2.5 thousand killed and 2 thousand prisoners in this battle. Napoleon I was forced to leave Moscow on October 7 (19), and advanced detachments of Russian troops entered it on October 10 (22). The French lost about 5 thousand people and began to retreat along the Old Smolensk Road, which they had destroyed. The Tarutino battle and the battle of Maloyaroslavets marked a radical turning point in the war. The strategic initiative finally passed into the hands of the Russian command. From that time on, the fighting of Russian troops and partisans acquired an active character and included such methods of armed struggle as parallel pursuit and encirclement of enemy troops. The persecution was carried out in several directions: a detachment of Major General P.V. Golenishchev-Kutuzov operated north of the Smolensk road; along the Smolensk road - the Cossack regiments of the cavalry general; south of the Smolensk road - the vanguard of M. A. Miloradovich and the main forces of the Russian army. Having overtaken the enemy's rearguard near Vyazma, Russian troops defeated him on October 22 (November 3) - the French lost about 8.5 thousand people killed, wounded and captured, then in battles near Dorogobuzh, near Dukhovshchina, near the village of Lyakhovo (now Glinsky district of Smolensk region) - more than 10 thousand people.
The surviving part of Napoleon's army retreated to Smolensk, but there were no food supplies or reserves there. Napoleon I hastily began to withdraw his troops further. But in the battles near Krasnoye and then near Molodechno, Russian troops defeated the French. Scattered enemy units retreated to the river along the road to Borisov. The 3rd Western Army was approaching there to join the corps of P.H. Wittgenstein. Her troops occupied Minsk on November 4 (16), and on November 9 (21), P. V. Chichagov’s army approached Borisov and, after a battle with the detachment of General Ya. Kh. Dombrovsky, occupied the city and the right bank of the Berezina. Wittgenstein's corps, after a stubborn battle with the French corps of Marshal L. Saint-Cyr, captured Polotsk on October 8 (20). Having crossed the Western Dvina, Russian troops occupied Lepel (now Vitebsk region, Belarus) and defeated the French at Chashniki. With the approach of Russian troops to the Berezina, a “sack” was formed in the Borisov area, in which the retreating French troops were surrounded. However, Wittgenstein's indecision and Chichagov's mistakes made it possible for Napoleon I to prepare a crossing across the Berezina and avoid the complete destruction of his army. Having reached Smorgon (now Grodno region, Belarus), on November 23 (December 5), Napoleon I left for Paris, and the remnants of his army were almost completely destroyed.
On December 14 (26), Russian troops occupied Bialystok and Brest-Litovsk (now Brest), completing the liberation of the territory of the Russian Empire. On December 21, 1812 (January 2, 1813), M.I. Kutuzov, in an order to the army, congratulated the troops on expelling the enemy from the country and called on “to complete the defeat of the enemy on his own fields.”
The victory in the Patriotic War of 1812 preserved the independence of Russia, and the defeat of the Great Army not only dealt a crushing blow to the military power of Napoleonic France, but also played a decisive role in the liberation of a number of European states from French expansion, strengthened the liberation struggle of the Spanish people, etc. As a result of the Russian army in 1813 -14 and the liberation struggle of the peoples of Europe, the Napoleonic empire collapsed. The victory in the Patriotic War was at the same time used to strengthen autocracy both in the Russian Empire and in Europe. Alexander I headed the Holy Alliance created by European monarchs, whose activities were aimed at suppressing the revolutionary, republican and liberation movements in Europe. The Napoleonic army lost over 500 thousand people in Russia, all the cavalry and almost all the artillery (only the corps of J. MacDonald and K. Schwarzenberg survived); Russian troops - about 300 thousand people.
The Patriotic War of 1812 is distinguished by its large spatial scope, tension, and variety of strategic and tactical forms of armed struggle. The military art of Napoleon I, which surpassed that of all the armies of Europe at that time, collapsed in a clash with the Russian army. Russian strategy surpassed Napoleonic strategy, designed for a short-term campaign. M.I. Kutuzov skillfully used the popular nature of the war and, taking into account political and strategic factors, implemented his plan to fight the Napoleonic army. The experience of the Patriotic War contributed to the consolidation of column and loose formation tactics in the actions of troops, increasing the role of aimed fire, improving the interaction of infantry, cavalry and artillery; The form of organization of military formations - divisions and corps - was firmly established. The reserve became an integral part of the battle formation, and the role of artillery in battle increased.
The Patriotic War of 1812 occupies an important place in the history of Russia. She demonstrated the unity of all classes in the fight against foreigners. aggression, was the most important factor in the formation of Russian self-awareness. people. Under the influence of the victory over Napoleon I, the ideology of the Decembrists began to take shape. The experience of the war was summarized in the works of domestic and foreign military historians; the patriotism of the Russian people and army inspired the creativity of Russian writers, artists, and composers. The victory in the Patriotic War was associated with the construction of the Cathedral of Christ the Savior in Moscow and numerous churches throughout the Russian Empire; military trophies were kept in the Kazan Cathedral. The events of the Patriotic War are captured in numerous monuments on the Borodino field, in Maloyaroslavets and Tarutino, reflected in triumphal arches in Moscow and St. Petersburg, paintings of the Winter Palace, the panorama “Battle of Borodino” in Moscow, etc. A huge amount of memoir literature has been preserved about the Patriotic War.
Additional literature:
Akhsharumov D.I. Description of the War of 1812. St. Petersburg, 1819;
Buturlin D.P. The history of Emperor Napoleon's invasion of Russia in 1812. 2nd ed. St. Petersburg, 1837-1838. Part 1-2;
Okunev N.A. Discourse on the great military actions, battles and battles that took place during the invasion of Russia in 1812. 2nd ed. St. Petersburg, 1841;
Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky A.I. Description of the Patriotic War of 1812. 3rd ed. St. Petersburg, 1843;
Bogdanovich M.I. History of the Patriotic War of 1812 according to reliable sources. St. Petersburg, 1859-1860. T. 1-3;
Patriotic War of 1812: Materials of the Military Scientific Archive. Dept. 1-2. St. Petersburg, 1900-1914. [Vol. 1-22];
Patriotic War and Russian society, 1812-1912. M., 1911-1912. T. 1-7;
Great Patriotic War: 1812 St. Petersburg, 1912;
Zhilin P.A. Counter-offensive of the Russian army in 1812. 2nd ed. M., 1953;
aka. The death of Napoleonic army in Russia. 2nd ed. M., 1974;
aka. Patriotic War of 1812. 3rd ed. M., 1988;
M.I. Kutuzov: [Documents and materials]. M., 1954-1955. T. 4. Parts 1-2;
1812: Sat. articles. M., 1962;
Babkin V.I. People's militia in the Patriotic War of 1812. M., 1962;
Beskrovny L.G. Patriotic War of 1812. M., 1962;
Korneychik E.I. The Belarusian people in the Patriotic War of 1812. Minsk, 1962;
Sirotkin V.G. Duel of two diplomacy: Russia and France in 1801-1812. M., 1966;
aka. Alexander the First and Napoleon: a duel on the eve of the war. M., 2012;
Tartakovsky A.G. 1812 and Russian memoirs: Experience in source study. M., 1980;
Abalikhin B.S., Dunaevsky V.A. 1812 at the crossroads of the opinions of Soviet historians, 1917-1987. M., 1990;
1812. Memoirs of soldiers of the Russian army: From the collection of the Department of Written Sources of the State Historical Museum. M., 1991;
Tarle E.V. Napoleon's invasion of Russia, 1812. M., 1992;
aka. 1812: El. works. M., 1994;
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