The Great Patriotic War. Great Patriotic War Line of Defense 1941 map
After the Germans were driven back from Moscow, fighting continued in this place for almost a year and a half.
The whole ground is covered in barbed wire, shell casings, and cartridges.
the village of Studenoye was with the Germans and the village of Sloboda (1 km to the East) with ours
239th Red Banner Rifle Division: From 01 to 01/05/1942 it fought unsuccessfully for Sukhinichi, then the division received an order to go to the Meshchovsk area, with a view to subsequently attacking Serpeisk (two companies were left to block Sukhinichi). Participation in the capture of Meshchovsk was not required; the division moved to Serpeisk. In the afternoon of 01/07/1942, she occupied Serpeisk and continued the offensive in a northwestern direction. On January 12, 1942, she fought in the area of Kirsanovo, Pyatnitsa, Shershnevo, Krasny Kholm, developing an attack in the direction of Chiplyaevo station (8 kilometers northwest of Bakhmutov). From January 16, 1942 she was subordinate to the commander of the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps.
Re: 326th Roslavl Red Banner Rifle Division
« Reply #1: 28 02 2011, 15:21:06 »
The new directive required the 10th Army to reach the area of Kozelsk with its main forces by the end of December 27, to capture the large railway junction and the city of Sukhinichi by the same date with mobile advance detachments, and also to conduct deep reconnaissance to the northwest in the direction of Baryatinskaya station, to the west to the city of Kirov and to the south of it to the city of Lyudinovo.
The 239th and 324th rifle divisions were already beyond the Oka River and were approaching Kozelsk. To their left at the crossing was the 323rd Infantry Division, the 322nd and 328th divisions entered the battle for access to the left bank of the river in the Belev area. The 330th Rifle Regiment came in contact with them, the 325th and 326th went behind the center of the army in the second echelon. On December 31, by order of the front commander, they took up defense: the 325th in the Kozelsk area, the 326th in the Mekhovoe, Berezovka, Zvyagino area, subsequently the 325th Infantry Division was ordered to attack Meshchovsk, Mosalsk, i.e. north of Sukhinichi, the 326th Rifle Regiment received the task of attacking Baryatinskaya along the Sukhinichi - Chiplyaevo railway.
At the stations Matchino, Probozhdenie and Tsekh, the 330th and 326th divisions captured large warehouses of Soviet-made ammunition. On January 9, there were about 36 thousand shells and mines. This immediately eased our situation. The 761st and 486th army artillery regiments, which finally arrived at Sukhinichi on January 25, began to be supplied from these same warehouses.
The commander of the 1099th regiment, Major F.D. Stepanov, decided to bypass Baryatinskaya from the south with one battalion, and strike from the north, through Red Hill, with two battalions. The first attempt to occupy Baryatinskaya on the move was unsuccessful. The enemy already in Red Hill put up stubborn resistance. It was January 10th. The battle dragged on until darkness. A snowstorm arose. The battalion advancing from the south lost its way. The battalion commander, senior lieutenant Romankevich, figured out the mistake only when he got out a little southwest of Baryatinskaya. Contact with the regiment commander was lost. However, the battalion commander was not at a loss. By his decision, the battalion cut the country road to Studenovo and the railway going west to the Zanoznaya station. We quickly made snow trenches. Four soldiers sent with reports from the battalion to the regiment, as it turned out later, were killed by the Nazis.
Having no information about this battalion, the division commander brought the 1097th regiment from the south to operate on Baryatinskaya. With an attack by two regiments, the station and the village of Baryatinskaya were liberated on the morning of January 11.
Romankevich’s battalion also played an important role here. The enemy with all his convoys rushed from Baryatinskaya to the west, but suddenly, in the complete darkness of the night, he was met by fire from 12 machine guns of this battalion. Up to 300 Nazis were destroyed, many mortars and machine guns were captured, as well as a large convoy.
At the station there was a large warehouse with Soviet ammunition. They were abandoned by our troops during the retreat. During their retreat, the Nazis did not have time to destroy the warehouse. There were huge reserves of 76, 122, 152 and 85 mm shells, 82 mm mines, hand grenades and rifle cartridges. Subsequently, from this warehouse, for several months, troops not only of our army, but also of neighboring ones were supplied (94).
Here at the station, German warehouses with large reserves of grain and hay were captured. All this also turned out to be very necessary for us.
By the end of January 11, the 326th Division occupied Staraya Sloboda, Perenezhye, and Baryatinskaya.
As the 326th and 330th Rifle Divisions approached Baryatinskaya and Kirov, information was received that many enemy transport planes with troops were landing nearby at a large airfield every day. This information was completely confirmed. Throughout January, the enemy hastily transported military units from the west by air. The Goering Guard Regiment, the Airborne Regiment, the 19th Airfield Battalion and the 13th Aircraft Battalion arrived from Germany to protect the airfield. The last two battalions were previously in France. The capture of prisoners confirmed the presence of units of the 34th and rear of the 216th infantry divisions in the area.
The enemy deployed a police battalion to cover the Zanoznaya and Borets stations. In Zanoznaya there was also a detachment of two battalions formed from vacationers of the 216th Infantry Division. There were up to 800 people there. At the airfield itself there was an artillery anti-aircraft group of Wedesheim. It also included field artillery batteries. In general, in the area of Shemelinka, Zanoznaya, Shaikovka, Goroditsa, Studenovo there were enemy forces up to an infantry division.
The nearby airfield played a very important role in the actions of enemy aircraft. It was necessary to take it. I assigned this task to the 326th and 330th divisions. The 326th Infantry Division was entrusted with the main task of capturing the airfield. The 330th Infantry Division, with a strike from two regiments from the south, assisted it in successfully completing the task. Having advanced to their lines by the end of January 12, parts of the divisions covered the airfield from the east, north, south and partly from the west. On the approaches to it the enemy put up stubborn resistance. During the fighting, the intensive landing of new military teams from Ju-52 aircraft did not stop.
By the end of January 15, the airfield was almost completely surrounded. The enemy could only retreat to the northwest in the area of the villages of Priyut and Degonka.
During January 16 and 17, our regiments again attacked the airfield, but the attack was unsuccessful. The attackers suffered severely from enemy air raids, having no cover against them. The fighting for the airfield was fierce. In these battles, the soldiers of both divisions showed dedication, tenacity, bravery, courage and resourcefulness. After putting the units in order and regrouping, the 326th Division again launched an attack on the airfield on the night of January 19. Intense fighting continued throughout the day. However, we were unable to take the airfield. Despite the shelling conducted from open positions by our small artillery, the landing and takeoff of enemy transport and combat aircraft continued, although he suffered considerable losses in aircraft. From January 12 to the end of the month, our artillery knocked out 18 large enemy aircraft. In prolonged battles for the airfield area, our units were unable to break the enemy’s resistance, mainly due to the action of his combat aircraft, and suffered heavy losses. The regiments of the 330th and 326th rifle divisions each had 250–300 bayonets left. During the period from January 9 to January 19 alone, the 326th Infantry Division lost 2,562 people killed and wounded. The offensive capabilities of both divisions were clearly exhausted.
At the same time, there was a threat of being surrounded by units of the 330th and 326th Rifle Divisions from the flanks. This happened, firstly, in connection with the enemy going on the offensive from Lyudinovo and Zhizdra in the direction of Sukhinichi with simultaneous attempts to help this attack with attacks from the Milyatinsky plant, Chiplyaevo, Fomino 2nd, Fomino 1st areas. In this regard, both regiments of the 330th Infantry Division had to be taken from the airfield and returned to the Kirov area.
The attack on the Soviet Union occurred without a declaration of war in the morning hours of June 22, 1941. Despite long preparations for the war, the attack turned out to be completely unexpected for the USSR, since the German leadership did not even have a pretext for the attack.
The military events of the first weeks inspired full hope for the success of the next “blitzkrieg”. Armored formations advanced quickly and occupied vast areas of the country. In major battles and encirclement, the Soviet Army suffered millions of losses in killed and captured. A large amount of military equipment was destroyed or captured as trophies. Once again it seemed that the doubts and feelings of fear that had spread in Germany, despite careful ideological preparation, were refuted by the successes of the Wehrmacht. The Church Board of Trustees of the German Evangelical Church expressed the sentiments of many by assuring Hitler by telegraph that “he is supported by the entire evangelical Christianity of the Reich in the decisive battles with the mortal enemy of order and Western Christian culture.”
The successes of the Wehrmacht caused various reactions from the Soviet side. There were manifestations of panic and confusion, soldiers left their military units. And even Stalin addressed the population for the first time only on July 3. In areas captured or annexed by the Soviet Union in 1939/40. part of the population welcomed the Germans as liberators. Nevertheless, from the first day of the war, Soviet troops showed unexpectedly strong resistance even in the most hopeless situations. And the civilian population actively participated in the evacuation and relocation of militarily important industrial facilities beyond the Urals.
Stubborn Soviet resistance and heavy losses of the German Wehrmacht (up to December 1, 1941, about 200,000 killed and missing, almost 500,000 wounded) soon dashed German hopes for an easy and quick victory. Autumn mud, snow and terrible cold in winter hampered the Wehrmacht's military operations. The German army was not prepared for war in winter conditions; it was believed that by this time victory would have already been achieved. The attempt to capture Moscow as the political center of the Soviet Union failed, although German troops approached the city at a distance of 30 kilometers. At the beginning of December, the Soviet Army unexpectedly launched a counteroffensive, which was successful not only near Moscow, but also on other sectors of the front. Thus, the concept of lightning war finally collapsed.
In the summer of 1942, new forces were accumulated to advance in the southern direction. Although German troops managed to capture large territories and advance as far as the Caucasus, they were unable to gain a foothold anywhere. The oil fields were in Soviet hands, and Stalingrad became a bridgehead on the western bank of the Volga. In November 1942, the German front line on the territory of the Soviet Union reached its greatest extent, but there could be no talk of decisive success.
Chronicle of the war from June 1941 to November 1942
22.6.41. The beginning of the German attack, the advance of three army groups. Romania, Italy, Slovakia, Finland and Hungary entered the war on the side of Germany.29/30.6.41 The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks declares the war a “patriotic” war of the entire people; formation of the State Defense Committee.
July August. German offensive along the entire front, destruction of large Soviet formations in the encirclement (Bialystok and Minsk: 328,000 prisoners, Smolensk: 310,000 prisoners).
September. Leningrad is cut off from the rest of the country. East of Kyiv, over 600,000 Soviet soldiers were captured and surrounded. The general offensive of the German troops, which suffer heavy losses, is slowed down due to the constant resistance of the Soviet Army.
2.10.41. The offensive on Moscow began; some sections of the front line at the end of November were 30 km from Moscow.
5.12.41. The beginning of the Soviet counter-offensive with fresh forces near Moscow, the German retreat. After Hitler's intervention, Army Group Center's defensive positions were stabilized in January 1942 at the cost of heavy losses. Soviet success in the south.
12/11/41. Germany declares war on the USA.
In 1941, the Soviet Army lost 1.5 - 2.5 million soldiers killed and about 3 million captured. The number of civilian deaths is not precisely established, but is estimated in the millions. The losses of the German army were about 200,000 people killed and missing.
January - March 1942 Wide winter offensive of the Soviet Army, partly successful, but did not achieve its goals due to heavy losses. The losses of the German army in manpower and equipment were also so great that continuing the offensive on a broad front turned out to be impossible at the moment.
May. The failure of the Soviet offensive near Kharkov; During the counter-offensive, 250,000 Soviet soldiers were surrounded and captured.
June July. Capture of the fortress of Sevastopol and thereby the entire Crimea. The beginning of the German summer offensive, with the goal of reaching the Volga and capturing oil fields in the Caucasus. The Soviet side, in view of Germany's new victories, is in a state of crisis.
August. German troops reach the Caucasus Mountains, but are unable to decisively defeat the Soviet troops.
September. The beginning of the battles for Stalingrad, which was almost entirely captured by the Germans in October. Nevertheless, the Soviet bridgehead on the western bank of the Volga under the command of General Chuikov could not be destroyed.
9.11.42. The beginning of the Soviet counteroffensive at Stalingrad.
50 The Soviet population listens on the street to the government announcement about the beginning of the war, June 22, 1941.
Text 33
From a radio speech by People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Molotov on June 22, 1941.
Citizens and women of the Soviet Union! The Soviet government and its head, Comrade Stalin, instructed me to make the following statement: Today, at 4 o'clock in the morning, without declaring any claims against the Soviet Union, without declaring war, German troops attacked our country, attacked our borders in many places and bombed our cities from their planes - Zhitomir, Kiev, Sevastopol, Kaunas and some others, and more than two hundred people were killed and wounded. Enemy air raids and artillery shelling were also carried out from Romanian and Finnish territories. This unheard of attack on our country is a treachery unparalleled in the history of civilized nations. The attack on our country was carried out despite the fact that a non-aggression treaty was concluded between the USSR and Germany, and the Soviet government fulfilled all the terms of this treaty in all good faith. The attack on our country was carried out despite the fact that during the entire duration of this treaty the German government could never make a single claim against the USSR regarding the implementation of the treaty. All responsibility for this predatory attack on the Soviet Union will fall entirely on the German fascist rulers. [...]
This war was imposed on us not by the German people, not by German workers, peasants and intellectuals, whose suffering we well understand, but by a clique of bloodthirsty fascist rulers of Germany who enslaved the French, Czechs, Poles, Serbs, Norway, Belgium, Denmark, Holland, Greece and other peoples . [...]
This is not the first time our people have had to deal with an attacking, arrogant enemy. At one time, our people responded to Napoleon’s campaign in Russia with a Patriotic War and Napoleon was defeated and came to his collapse. The same will happen to the arrogant Hitler, who announced a new campaign against our country. The Red Army and all our people will once again wage a victorious patriotic war for the Motherland, for honor, for freedom.
Text 34
An excerpt from Elena Scriabina’s diary dated June 22, 1941 about the news of the German attack.
Molotov’s speech sounded hesitantly, hurriedly, as if he was short of breath. His encouragement sounded completely out of place. Immediately there was a feeling that a monster was slowly approaching menacingly and terrifying everyone. After the news, I ran out into the street. The city was in panic. People quickly exchanged a few words, rushed into stores and bought everything they could get their hands on. They rushed through the streets as if beside themselves; many went to savings banks to take away their savings. This wave overwhelmed me, too, and I tried to get rubles from my savings book. But I arrived too late, the cash register was empty, the payment was suspended, everyone was making noise and complaining. And the June day was blazing, the heat was unbearable, someone felt bad, someone cursed in despair. The whole day the mood was restless and tense. Only in the evening it became strangely quiet. It seemed that everyone was huddled somewhere in horror. Text 35
Excerpts from the diary of NKVD Major Shabalin from October 6 to October 19, 1941
Major Shabalin died on October 20. when trying to get out of the environment. The diary was transferred to the German army for military analysis. Back translation from German; the original is lost.
Diary
NKVD Major Shabalin,
head of the special department of the NKVD
at 50 army
For accuracy of transmission
Chief of Staff of the 2nd Tank Army
Subp. Frh.f. Liebenstein
[...]
The army is not what we are used to thinking and imagining at home. Huge shortage of everything. The attacks of our armies are disappointing.
We are interrogating a red-haired German prisoner, a shabby, man-haired guy, extremely stupid. [...]
The situation with personnel is very difficult; almost the entire army consists of people whose homelands were captured by the Germans. They want to go home. Inactivity at the front and sitting in the trenches demoralize the Red Army soldiers. There are cases of drunkenness among command and political personnel. People sometimes don't return from reconnaissance. [...]
The enemy has us surrounded. Continuous cannonade. Duel of artillerymen, mortarmen and machine gunners. Danger and fear almost all day long. I'm not even talking about the forest, swamp and overnight stay. Since the 12th I haven’t slept anymore, since October 8th I haven’t read a single newspaper.
Creepy! I wander around, there are corpses around, the horrors of war, continuous shelling! Hungry and sleepless again. I took a bottle of alcohol. I went into the forest to investigate. Our complete destruction is obvious. The army was defeated, the convoy was destroyed. I am writing in the forest by the fire. In the morning I lost all the security officers, I was left alone among strangers. The army fell apart.
I spent the night in the forest. I haven't eaten bread for three days. There are a lot of Red Army soldiers in the forest; there are no commanders. Throughout the night and morning, the Germans fired at the forest with weapons of all kinds. At about 7 o'clock in the morning we got up and walked north. The shooting continues. At the rest stop I washed my face. [...]
We walked all night in the rain through marshy areas. Pitchless darkness. I was soaked to the skin, my right leg was swollen; it's terribly hard to walk.
Text 36
Field mail letter from non-commissioned officer Robert Rupp to his wife dated July 1, 1941 about the attitude towards Soviet prisoners of war.
They say that the Fuhrer issued an order that prisoners and those who surrender are no longer subject to execution. It makes me happy. Finally! Many of the shot people I saw on the ground lay with their hands raised up, without weapons or even a belt. I've seen at least a hundred people like this. They say that even a parliamentarian walking with a white flag was shot dead! After lunch they said that the Russians were surrendering in whole companies. The method was bad. Even the wounded were shot. Text 37
Diary entry of former ambassador Ulrich von Hassell dated 18.8.1941 regarding Wehrmacht war crimes.
Ulrich von Hassell took an active part in the anti-Hitler Resistance of conservative circles and was executed after the assassination attempt on Hitler on July 20, 1944.
18. 8. 41 [...]
The whole war in the east is terrible, general savagery. One young officer received an order to destroy 350 civilians, including women and children, herded into a large barn, at first he refused to do this, but he was told that this was a failure to comply with the order, after which he asked for 10 minutes to think and finally did it , together with some others, directed machine-gun bursts into the open door of the barn into a crowd of people, and then, finishing off those still alive with machine guns. He was so shocked by this that, having later received a slight wound, he firmly decided not to return to the front.
Text 38
Excerpts from the order of the commander of the 17th Army, Colonel General Khot, dated November 17, 1941, regarding the basic principles of warfare.
Command 17th Army A.Gef.St.,
1a No. 0973/41 secret. from 11/17/41
[...]
2. The campaign to the East should end differently than, for example, the war against the French. This summer it is becoming increasingly clear to us that here, in the East, two internally irresistible views are fighting against each other: the German sense of honor and race, the centuries-old German army against the Asian type of thinking and primitive instincts, fueled by a small number of mainly Jewish intellectuals: fear of whip, neglect of moral values, equalization with inferiors, neglect of one’s life of no value.
51 The launch of German Junker Ju-87 (Stukas) dive bombers from a field airfield in the Soviet Union, 1941.
52 German infantry on the march, 1941
53 Soviet prisoners dig their own grave, 1941.
54 Soviet prisoners before execution, 1941. Both photographs (53 and 54) were in the wallet of a German soldier who died near Moscow. The location and circumstances of the shooting are unknown.
More strongly than ever, we believe in the historical turn when the German people, by virtue of the superiority of their race and their successes, will take over the government of Europe. We realize more clearly our calling to save European culture from Asian barbarism. Now we know that we have to fight an embittered and stubborn enemy. This struggle can only end in the destruction of one side or the other; there can be no agreement. [...]
6. I demand that every soldier in the army be imbued with pride in our successes and a sense of unconditional superiority. We are the masters of this country which we have conquered. Our sense of dominance is expressed not in well-fed tranquility, not in disdainful behavior, and not even in the selfish abuse of power by individuals, but in conscious opposition to Bolshevism, in strict discipline, unyielding determination and tireless vigilance.
8. There should be absolutely no place for sympathy and softness towards the population. The Red soldiers brutally killed our wounded; they brutally dealt with the prisoners and killed them. We must remember this if the population that once endured the Bolshevik yoke now wants to accept us with joy and worship. One should behave towards Volksdeutsche with a sense of self-awareness and calm restraint. The fight against impending food difficulties should be left to the self-government of the enemy population. Any trace of active or passive resistance or any machinations of Bolshevik-Jewish instigators must be immediately eradicated. The need for brutal measures against elements hostile to the people and our policy must be understood by the soldiers. [...]
In everyday life, we should not lose sight of the global significance of our struggle against Soviet Russia. The Russian mass has been paralyzing Europe for two centuries. The need to take Russia into account and the fear of its possible attack constantly dominated political relations in Europe and hampered peaceful development. Russia is not a European, but an Asian state. Every step into the depths of this dull, enslaved country allows one to see this difference. Europe and especially Germany must be freed forever from this pressure and from the destructive forces of Bolshevism.
For this we fight and work.
Commander Hoth (signed)
Send to the following units: regiments and individual battalions, including construction and service units, to the patrol commander; distributor 1a; reserve = 10 copies.
Text 39
Report from the rear commander of the 2nd Panzer Army, General von Schenkendorff, dated March 24, 1942, regarding the looting.
Commander of the 2nd Tank Army 24.3.42 Rel.: unauthorized requisition;
Application
1) The rear commander of the 2nd Tank Army in a daily report dated 2/23/42: “The unauthorized requisition by German soldiers near Navleya is increasing. From Gremyachey (28 km southwest of Karachev), soldiers from the Karachevo area took 76 cows without a certificate, and from Plastovoye (32 km southwest of Karachev) - 69 cows. In both places there was not a single head of cattle left. In addition, the Russian law enforcement service in Plastov was disarmed; the next day the village was occupied by partisans. In the area of Sinezerko (25 km south of Bryansk), soldiers of the platoon commander, Fel-Feb Sebastian (code 2), wildly requisitioned livestock, and in a neighboring village they shot at the village headman and his assistants. [...]
Such cases are being reported more and more frequently. In this regard, I especially point out the orders issued on the conduct of troops and their supply in the country in accordance with the order. They are once again reflected in the application.”
The Great Patriotic War- the war of the USSR with Germany and its allies in – years and with Japan in 1945; component of World War II.
From the point of view of the leadership of Nazi Germany, war with the USSR was inevitable. The communist regime was seen by them as alien, and at the same time capable of striking at any moment. Only the rapid defeat of the USSR gave the Germans the opportunity to ensure dominance on the European continent. In addition, it gave them access to the rich industrial and agricultural regions of Eastern Europe.
At the same time, according to some historians, Stalin himself, at the end of 1939, decided on a preemptive attack on Germany in the summer of 1941. On June 15, Soviet troops began their strategic deployment and advance to the western border. According to one version, this was done with the aim of striking Romania and German-occupied Poland, according to another, to frighten Hitler and force him to abandon plans to attack the USSR.
First period of the war (June 22, 1941 – November 18, 1942)
The first stage of the German offensive (June 22 – July 10, 1941)
On June 22, the USSR carried out the mobilization of those liable for military service born in 1905–1918; from the first days of the war, a massive registration of volunteers began. On June 23, an emergency body of the highest military command was created in the USSR to direct military operations - the Headquarters of the Main Command, and there was also maximum centralization of military and political power in the hands of Stalin.
On June 22, British Prime Minister William Churchill made a radio statement about support for the USSR in its fight against Hitlerism. On June 23, the US State Department welcomed the efforts of the Soviet people to repel the German invasion, and on June 24, US President F. Roosevelt promised to provide the USSR with all possible assistance.
On July 18, the Soviet leadership decided to organize the partisan movement in the occupied and front-line areas, which became widespread in the second half of the year.
In the summer and autumn of 1941, about 10 million people were evacuated to the east. and more than 1350 large enterprises. The militarization of the economy began to be carried out with harsh and energetic measures; All the country's material resources were mobilized for military needs.
The main reason for the defeats of the Red Army, despite its quantitative and often qualitative (T-34 and KV tanks) technical superiority, was the poor training of privates and officers, the low level of operation of military equipment and the troops’ lack of experience in conducting large military operations in modern warfare. . Repressions against the high command in 1937–1940 also played a significant role.
Second stage of the German offensive (July 10 – September 30, 1941)
On July 10, Finnish troops launched an offensive and on September 1, the 23rd Soviet Army on the Karelian Isthmus retreated to the line of the old state border, occupied before the Finnish War of 1939–1940. By October 10, the front had stabilized along the line Kestenga - Ukhta - Rugozero - Medvezhyegorsk - Lake Onega. - R. Svir. The enemy was unable to cut off the communication routes between European Russia and the northern ports.
On July 10, Army Group North launched an offensive in the Leningrad and Tallinn directions. Novgorod fell on August 15, Gatchina on August 21. On August 30, the Germans reached the Neva, cutting off the railway connection with the city, and on September 8 they took Shlisselburg and closed the blockade ring around Leningrad. Only the tough measures of the new commander of the Leningrad Front, G.K. Zhukov, made it possible to stop the enemy by September 26.
On July 16, the Romanian 4th Army took Chisinau; The defense of Odessa lasted about two months. Soviet troops left the city only in the first half of October. At the beginning of September, Guderian crossed the Desna and on September 7 captured Konotop (“Konotop breakthrough”). Five Soviet armies were surrounded; the number of prisoners was 665 thousand. Left Bank Ukraine was in the hands of the Germans; the path to Donbass was open; Soviet troops in Crimea found themselves cut off from the main forces.
Defeats on the fronts prompted Headquarters to issue order No. 270 on August 16, which qualified all soldiers and officers who surrendered as traitors and deserters; their families were deprived of state support and subject to exile.
Third stage of the German offensive (September 30 – December 5, 1941)
On September 30, Army Group Center launched an operation to capture Moscow (“Typhoon”). On October 3, Guderian's tanks broke into Oryol and reached the road to Moscow. On October 6–8, all three armies of the Bryansk Front were surrounded south of Bryansk, and the main forces of the Reserve (19th, 20th, 24th and 32nd armies) were surrounded west of Vyazma; the Germans captured 664 thousand prisoners and more than 1200 tanks. But the advance of the 2nd Wehrmacht tank group to Tula was thwarted by the stubborn resistance of M.E. Katukov’s brigade near Mtsensk; The 4th Tank Group occupied Yukhnov and rushed to Maloyaroslavets, but was delayed at Medyn by Podolsk cadets (6–10 October); The autumn thaw also slowed down the pace of the German advance.
On October 10, the Germans attacked the right wing of the Reserve Front (renamed the Western Front); On October 12, the 9th Army captured Staritsa, and on October 14, Rzhev. On October 19, a state of siege was declared in Moscow. On October 29, Guderian tried to take Tula, but was repulsed with heavy losses. In early November, the new commander of the Western Front, Zhukov, with an incredible effort of all his forces and constant counterattacks, managed, despite huge losses in manpower and equipment, to stop the Germans in other directions.
On September 27, the Germans broke through the defense line of the Southern Front. Most of Donbass fell into German hands. During the successful counter-offensive of the troops of the Southern Front on November 29, Rostov was liberated, and the Germans were driven back to the Mius River.
In the second half of October, the 11th German Army broke through into Crimea and by mid-November captured almost the entire peninsula. Soviet troops managed to hold only Sevastopol.
Counter-offensive of the Red Army near Moscow (December 5, 1941 – January 7, 1942)
On December 5–6, the Kalinin, Western and Southwestern fronts switched to offensive operations in the northwestern and southwestern directions. The successful advance of the Soviet troops forced Hitler on December 8 to issue a directive to go on the defensive along the entire front line. On December 18, the troops of the Western Front began an offensive in the central direction. As a result, by the beginning of the year the Germans were thrown back 100–250 km to the west. There was a threat of envelopment of Army Group Center from the north and south. The strategic initiative passed to the Red Army.
The success of the operation near Moscow prompted Headquarters to decide to launch a general offensive along the entire front from Lake Ladoga to the Crimea. The offensive operations of the Soviet troops in December 1941 - April 1942 led to a significant change in the military-strategic situation on the Soviet-German front: the Germans were driven back from Moscow, the Moscow, part of the Kalinin, Oryol and Smolensk regions were liberated. There was also a psychological turning point among soldiers and civilians: faith in victory strengthened, the myth of the invincibility of the Wehrmacht was destroyed. The collapse of the plan for a lightning war raised doubts about the successful outcome of the war among both the German military-political leadership and ordinary Germans.
Lyuban operation (January 13 – June 25)
The Lyuban operation was aimed at breaking the blockade of Leningrad. On January 13, the forces of the Volkhov and Leningrad fronts began an offensive in several directions, planning to unite at Lyuban and encircle the enemy’s Chudov group. On March 19, the Germans launched a counterattack, cutting off the 2nd Shock Army from the rest of the forces of the Volkhov Front. Soviet troops repeatedly tried to unblock it and resume the offensive. On May 21, Headquarters decided to withdraw it, but on June 6, the Germans completely closed the encirclement. On June 20, soldiers and officers received orders to leave the encirclement on their own, but only a few managed to do this (according to various estimates, from 6 to 16 thousand people); Army commander A.A. Vlasov surrendered.
Military operations in May-November 1942
Having defeated the Crimean Front (almost 200 thousand people were captured), the Germans occupied Kerch on May 16, and Sevastopol in early July. On May 12, troops of the Southwestern Front and Southern Front launched an attack on Kharkov. For several days it developed successfully, but on May 19 the Germans defeated the 9th Army, throwing it back beyond the Seversky Donets, went to the rear of the advancing Soviet troops and captured them in a pincer movement on May 23; the number of prisoners reached 240 thousand. On June 28–30, the German offensive began against the left wing of the Bryansk and the right wing of the Southwestern Front. On July 8, the Germans captured Voronezh and reached the Middle Don. By July 22, the 1st and 4th Tank Armies reached the Southern Don. On July 24, Rostov-on-Don was captured.
In the context of a military catastrophe in the south, on July 28, Stalin issued order No. 227 “Not a step back,” which provided for severe punishments for retreating without instructions from above, barrier detachments to combat those who left their positions without permission, and penal units for operations in the most dangerous sectors of the front. On the basis of this order, about 1 million military personnel were convicted during the war years, 160 thousand of them were shot, and 400 thousand were sent to penal companies.
On July 25, the Germans crossed the Don and rushed south. In mid-August, the Germans established control over almost all the passes of the central part of the Main Caucasus Range. In the Grozny direction, the Germans occupied Nalchik on October 29, they failed to take Ordzhonikidze and Grozny, and in mid-November their further advance was stopped.
On August 16, German troops launched an offensive towards Stalingrad. On September 13, fighting began in Stalingrad itself. In the second half of October - the first half of November, the Germans captured a significant part of the city, but were unable to break the resistance of the defenders.
By mid-November, the Germans had established control over the Right Bank of the Don and most of the North Caucasus, but did not achieve their strategic goals - to break through to the Volga region and Transcaucasia. This was prevented by counterattacks of the Red Army in other directions (Rzhev meat grinder, tank battle between Zubtsov and Karmanovo, etc.), which, although they were not successful, nevertheless did not allow the Wehrmacht command to transfer reserves to the south.
Second period of the war (November 19, 1942 – December 31, 1943): a radical turning point
Victory at Stalingrad (November 19, 1942 – February 2, 1943)
On November 19, units of the Southwestern Front broke through the defenses of the 3rd Romanian Army and on November 21 captured five Romanian divisions in a pincer movement (Operation Saturn). On November 23, units of the two fronts united at Sovetsky and surrounded the enemy’s Stalingrad group.
On December 16, troops of the Voronezh and Southwestern Fronts launched Operation Little Saturn in the Middle Don, defeated the 8th Italian Army, and on January 26, the 6th Army was cut into two parts. On January 31, the southern group led by F. Paulus capitulated, on February 2 – the northern; 91 thousand people were captured. The Battle of Stalingrad, despite the heavy losses of Soviet troops, was the beginning of a radical turning point in the Great Patriotic War. The Wehrmacht suffered a major defeat and lost its strategic initiative. Japan and Türkiye abandoned their intention to enter the war on the side of Germany.
Economic recovery and transition to the offensive in the central direction
By this time, a turning point had also occurred in the sphere of the Soviet military economy. Already in the winter of 1941/1942 it was possible to stop the decline in mechanical engineering. The rise of ferrous metallurgy began in March, and the energy and fuel industry began in the second half of 1942. By the beginning, the USSR had a clear economic superiority over Germany.
In November 1942 - January 1943, the Red Army went on the offensive in the central direction.
Operation Mars (Rzhevsko-Sychevskaya) was carried out with the aim of eliminating the Rzhevsko-Vyazma bridgehead. Formations of the Western Front made their way through the Rzhev-Sychevka railway and carried out a raid on enemy rear lines, but significant losses and a lack of tanks, guns and ammunition forced them to stop, but this operation did not allow the Germans to transfer part of their forces from the central direction to Stalingrad.
Liberation of the North Caucasus (January 1 – February 12, 1943)
On January 1–3, the operation to liberate the North Caucasus and the Don bend began. Mozdok was liberated on January 3, Kislovodsk, Mineralnye Vody, Essentuki and Pyatigorsk were liberated on January 10–11, Stavropol was liberated on January 21. On January 24, the Germans surrendered Armavir, and on January 30, Tikhoretsk. On February 4, the Black Sea Fleet landed troops in the Myskhako area south of Novorossiysk. On February 12, Krasnodar was captured. However, the lack of forces prevented Soviet troops from encircling the enemy’s North Caucasian group.
Breaking the siege of Leningrad (January 12–30, 1943)
Fearing encirclement of the main forces of Army Group Center on the Rzhev-Vyazma bridgehead, the German command began their systematic withdrawal on March 1. On March 2, units of the Kalinin and Western Fronts began pursuing the enemy. On March 3, Rzhev was liberated, on March 6, Gzhatsk, and on March 12, Vyazma.
The January-March 1943 campaign, despite a number of setbacks, led to the liberation of a vast territory (North Caucasus, lower reaches of the Don, Voroshilovgrad, Voronezh, Kursk regions, part of the Belgorod, Smolensk and Kalinin regions). The blockade of Leningrad was broken, the Demyansky and Rzhev-Vyazemsky ledges were eliminated. Control over the Volga and Don was restored. The Wehrmacht suffered huge losses (approx. 1.2 million people). The depletion of human resources forced the Nazi leadership to carry out a total mobilization of older (over 46 years old) and younger ages (16–17 years old).
Since the winter of 1942/1943, the partisan movement in the German rear became an important military factor. The partisans caused serious damage to the German army, destroying manpower, blowing up warehouses and trains, and disrupting the communications system. The largest operations were raids by the M.I. detachment. Naumov in Kursk, Sumy, Poltava, Kirovograd, Odessa, Vinnitsa, Kyiv and Zhitomir (February-March 1943) and detachment S.A. Kovpak in the Rivne, Zhitomir and Kyiv regions (February-May 1943).
Defensive Battle of Kursk (July 5–23, 1943)
The Wehrmacht command developed Operation Citadel to encircle a strong group of the Red Army on the Kursk ledge through counter tank attacks from the north and south; If successful, it was planned to carry out Operation Panther to defeat the Southwestern Front. However, Soviet intelligence unraveled the Germans' plans, and in April-June a powerful defensive system of eight lines was created on the Kursk salient.
On July 5, the German 9th Army launched an attack on Kursk from the north, and the 4th Panzer Army from the south. On the northern flank, already on July 10, the Germans went on the defensive. On the southern wing, Wehrmacht tank columns reached Prokhorovka on July 12, but were stopped, and by July 23, the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe Front drove them back to their original lines. Operation Citadel failed.
The general offensive of the Red Army in the second half of 1943 (July 12 - December 24, 1943). Liberation of Left Bank Ukraine
On July 12, units of the Western and Bryansk fronts broke through the German defenses at Zhilkovo and Novosil, and by August 18, Soviet troops cleared the Oryol ledge of the enemy.
By September 22, units of the Southwestern Front pushed the Germans back beyond the Dnieper and reached the approaches to Dnepropetrovsk (now the Dnieper) and Zaporozhye; formations of the Southern Front occupied Taganrog, on September 8 Stalino (now Donetsk), on September 10 - Mariupol; The result of the operation was the liberation of Donbass.
On August 3, troops of the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts broke through the defenses of Army Group South in several places and captured Belgorod on August 5. On August 23, Kharkov was captured.
On September 25, through flank attacks from the south and north, the troops of the Western Front captured Smolensk and by the beginning of October entered the territory of Belarus.
On August 26, the Central, Voronezh and Steppe Fronts began the Chernigov-Poltava operation. The troops of the Central Front broke through the enemy defenses south of Sevsk and occupied the city on August 27; On September 13, we reached the Dnieper on the Loev-Kyiv section. Units of the Voronezh Front reached the Dnieper in the Kyiv-Cherkassy section. Units of the Steppe Front approached the Dnieper in the Cherkassy-Verkhnedneprovsk section. As a result, the Germans lost almost all of Left Bank Ukraine. At the end of September, Soviet troops crossed the Dnieper in several places and captured 23 bridgeheads on its right bank.
On September 1, the troops of the Bryansk Front overcame the Wehrmacht Hagen defense line and occupied Bryansk; by October 3, the Red Army reached the line of the Sozh River in Eastern Belarus.
On September 9, the North Caucasus Front, in cooperation with the Black Sea Fleet and the Azov Military Flotilla, launched an offensive on the Taman Peninsula. Having broken through the Blue Line, Soviet troops took Novorossiysk on September 16, and by October 9 they had completely cleared the peninsula of Germans.
On October 10, the Southwestern Front began an operation to liquidate the Zaporozhye bridgehead and captured Zaporozhye on October 14.
On October 11, the Voronezh (from October 20 - 1st Ukrainian) Front began the Kyiv operation. After two unsuccessful attempts to take the capital of Ukraine with an attack from the south (from the Bukrin bridgehead), it was decided to launch the main blow from the north (from the Lyutezh bridgehead). On November 1, in order to divert the enemy’s attention, the 27th and 40th armies moved towards Kyiv from the Bukrinsky bridgehead, and on November 3, the strike force of the 1st Ukrainian Front suddenly attacked it from the Lyutezhsky bridgehead and broke through the German defenses. On November 6, Kyiv was liberated.
On November 13, the Germans, having brought up reserves, launched a counter-offensive in the Zhitomir direction against the 1st Ukrainian Front in order to recapture Kyiv and restore defenses along the Dnieper. But the Red Army retained a vast strategic Kiev bridgehead on the right bank of the Dnieper.
During the period of hostilities from June 1 to December 31, the Wehrmacht suffered huge losses (1 million 413 thousand people), which it was no longer able to fully compensate. A significant part of the USSR territory occupied in 1941–1942 was liberated. The plans of the German command to gain a foothold on the Dnieper lines failed. Conditions were created for the expulsion of the Germans from Right Bank Ukraine.
Third period of the war (December 24, 1943 – May 11, 1945): defeat of Germany
After a series of failures throughout 1943, the German command abandoned attempts to seize the strategic initiative and switched to a tough defense. The main task of the Wehrmacht in the north was to prevent the Red Army from breaking through into the Baltic states and East Prussia, in the center to the border with Poland, and in the south to the Dniester and the Carpathians. The Soviet military leadership set the goal of the winter-spring campaign to defeat German troops on the extreme flanks - on the Right Bank of Ukraine and near Leningrad.
Liberation of Right Bank Ukraine and Crimea
On December 24, 1943, troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front launched an offensive in the western and southwestern directions (Zhitomir-Berdichev operation). Only at the cost of great effort and significant losses did the Germans manage to stop the Soviet troops on the line Sarny - Polonnaya - Kazatin - Zhashkov. On January 5–6, units of the 2nd Ukrainian Front attacked in the Kirovograd direction and captured Kirovograd on January 8, but were forced to stop the offensive on January 10. The Germans did not allow the troops of both fronts to unite and were able to hold the Korsun-Shevchenkovsky ledge, which posed a threat to Kyiv from the south.
On January 24, the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts launched a joint operation to defeat the Korsun-Shevchenskovsky enemy group. On January 28, the 6th and 5th Guards Tank Armies united at Zvenigorodka and closed the encirclement ring. On January 30, Kanev was taken, on February 14, Korsun-Shevchenkovsky. On February 17, the liquidation of the “boiler” was completed; More than 18 thousand Wehrmacht soldiers were captured.
On January 27, units of the 1st Ukrainian Front launched an attack from the Sarn region in the Lutsk-Rivne direction. On January 30, the offensive of the troops of the 3rd and 4th Ukrainian Fronts began on the Nikopol bridgehead. Having overcome fierce enemy resistance, on February 8 they captured Nikopol, on February 22 - Krivoy Rog, and by February 29 they reached the river. Ingulets.
As a result of the winter campaign of 1943/1944, the Germans were finally driven back from the Dnieper. In an effort to make a strategic breakthrough to the borders of Romania and prevent the Wehrmacht from gaining a foothold on the Southern Bug, Dniester and Prut rivers, the Headquarters developed a plan to encircle and defeat Army Group South in Right Bank Ukraine through a coordinated attack by the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts .
The final chord of the spring operation in the south was the expulsion of the Germans from Crimea. On May 7–9, troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front, with the support of the Black Sea Fleet, took Sevastopol by storm, and by May 12 they defeated the remnants of the 17th Army that fled to Chersonesus.
Leningrad-Novgorod operation of the Red Army (January 14 – March 1, 1944)
On January 14, troops of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts launched an offensive south of Leningrad and near Novgorod. After defeating the German 18th Army and pushing it back to Luga, they liberated Novgorod on January 20. In early February, units of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts reached the approaches to Narva, Gdov and Luga; On February 4 they took Gdov, on February 12 - Luga. The threat of encirclement forced the 18th Army to hastily retreat to the southwest. On February 17, the 2nd Baltic Front carried out a series of attacks against the 16th German Army on the Lovat River. At the beginning of March, the Red Army reached the Panther defensive line (Narva - Lake Peipus - Pskov - Ostrov); Most of the Leningrad and Kalinin regions were liberated.
Military operations in the central direction in December 1943 - April 1944
As the tasks of the winter offensive of the 1st Baltic, Western and Belorussian fronts, the Headquarters set the troops to reach the line Polotsk - Lepel - Mogilev - Ptich and the liberation of Eastern Belarus.
In December 1943 - February 1944, the 1st PribF made three attempts to capture Vitebsk, which did not lead to the capture of the city, but completely depleted the enemy forces. The offensive actions of the Polar Front in the Orsha direction on February 22–25 and March 5–9, 1944 were also unsuccessful.
In the Mozyr direction, the Belorussian Front (BelF) on January 8 dealt a strong blow to the flanks of the 2nd German Army, but thanks to a hasty retreat it managed to avoid encirclement. Lack of forces prevented Soviet troops from encircling and destroying the enemy’s Bobruisk group, and on February 26 the offensive was stopped. Formed on February 17 at the junction of the 1st Ukrainian and Belorussian (from February 24, 1st Belorussian) fronts, the 2nd Belorussian Front began the Polesie operation on March 15 with the goal of capturing Kovel and breaking through to Brest. Soviet troops surrounded Kovel, but on March 23 the Germans launched a counterattack and on April 4 released the Kovel group.
Thus, in the central direction during the winter-spring campaign of 1944, the Red Army was unable to achieve its goals; On April 15, she went on the defensive.
Offensive in Karelia (June 10 – August 9, 1944). Finland's withdrawal from the war
After the loss of most of the occupied territory of the USSR, the main task of the Wehrmacht was to prevent the Red Army from entering Europe and not to lose its allies. That is why the Soviet military-political leadership, having failed in attempts to reach a peace agreement with Finland in February-April 1944, decided to begin the summer campaign of the year with a strike in the north.
On June 10, 1944, LenF troops, with the support of the Baltic Fleet, launched an offensive on the Karelian Isthmus, as a result, control over the White Sea-Baltic Canal and the strategically important Kirov Railway connecting Murmansk with European Russia was restored. By early August, Soviet troops had liberated all of the occupied territory east of Ladoga; in the Kuolisma area they reached the Finnish border. Having suffered defeat, Finland entered into negotiations with the USSR on August 25. On September 4, she broke off relations with Berlin and ceased hostilities, on September 15 declared war on Germany, and on September 19 concluded a truce with the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition. The length of the Soviet-German front was reduced by a third. This allowed the Red Army to free up significant forces for operations in other directions.
Liberation of Belarus (June 23 – early August 1944)
Successes in Karelia prompted the Headquarters to carry out a large-scale operation to defeat the enemy in the central direction with the forces of three Belorussian and 1st Baltic fronts (Operation Bagration), which became the main event of the summer-autumn campaign of 1944.
The general offensive of the Soviet troops began on June 23–24. A coordinated attack by the 1st PribF and the right wing of the 3rd BF ended on June 26–27 with the liberation of Vitebsk and the encirclement of five German divisions. On June 26, units of the 1st BF took Zhlobin, on June 27–29 they surrounded and destroyed the enemy’s Bobruisk group, and on June 29 they liberated Bobruisk. As a result of the rapid offensive of the three Belarusian fronts, the German command’s attempt to organize a defense line along the Berezina was thwarted; On July 3, troops of the 1st and 3rd BF broke into Minsk and captured the 4th German Army south of Borisov (liquidated by July 11).
The German front began to collapse. Units of the 1st PribF occupied Polotsk on July 4 and, moving down the Western Dvina, entered the territory of Latvia and Lithuania, reached the coast of the Gulf of Riga, cutting off Army Group North stationed in the Baltic States from the rest of the Wehrmacht forces. Units of the right wing of the 3rd BF, having taken Lepel on June 28, broke through into the valley of the river in early July. Viliya (Nyaris), on August 17 they reached the border of East Prussia.
The troops of the left wing of the 3rd BF, having made a swift rush from Minsk, took Lida on July 3, on July 16, together with the 2nd BF, they took Grodno and at the end of July approached the north-eastern protrusion of the Polish border. The 2nd BF, advancing to the southwest, captured Bialystok on July 27 and drove the Germans beyond the Narev River. Parts of the right wing of the 1st BF, having liberated Baranovichi on July 8, and Pinsk on July 14, at the end of July they reached the Western Bug and reached the central section of the Soviet-Polish border; On July 28, Brest was captured.
As a result of Operation Bagration, Belarus, most of Lithuania and part of Latvia were liberated. The possibility of an offensive in East Prussia and Poland opened up.
Liberation of Western Ukraine and the offensive in Eastern Poland (July 13 – August 29, 1944)
Trying to stop the advance of Soviet troops in Belarus, the Wehrmacht command was forced to transfer units there from other sectors of the Soviet-German front. This facilitated the operations of the Red Army in other directions. On July 13–14, the offensive of the 1st Ukrainian Front began in Western Ukraine. Already on July 17, they crossed the state border of the USSR and entered South-Eastern Poland.
On July 18, the left wing of the 1st BF launched an offensive near Kovel. At the end of July they approached Prague (the right bank suburb of Warsaw), which they managed to take only on September 14. At the beginning of August, German resistance increased sharply, and the advance of the Red Army was stopped. Because of this, the Soviet command was unable to provide the necessary assistance to the uprising that broke out on August 1 in the Polish capital under the leadership of the Home Army, and by the beginning of October it was brutally suppressed by the Wehrmacht.
Offensive in the Eastern Carpathians (September 8 – October 28, 1944)
After the occupation of Estonia in the summer of 1941, Metropolitan of Tallinn. Alexander (Paulus) announced the separation of Estonian parishes from the Russian Orthodox Church (the Estonian Apostolic Orthodox Church was created on the initiative of Alexander (Paulus) in 1923, in 1941 the bishop repented of the sin of schism). In October 1941, at the insistence of the German General Commissioner of Belarus, the Belarusian Church was created. However, Panteleimon (Rozhnovsky), who headed it in the rank of Metropolitan of Minsk and Belarus, maintained canonical communication with the Patriarchal Locum Tenens Metropolitan. Sergius (Stragorodsky). After the forced retirement of Metropolitan Panteleimon in June 1942, his successor was Archbishop Philotheus (Narco), who also refused to arbitrarily proclaim a national autocephalous Church.
Considering the patriotic position of the Patriarchal Locum Tenens Metropolitan. Sergius (Stragorodsky), the German authorities initially prevented the activities of those priests and parishes that declared their affiliation with the Moscow Patriarchate. Over time, the German authorities began to be more tolerant of the communities of the Moscow Patriarchate. According to the occupiers, these communities only verbally declared their loyalty to the Moscow center, but in reality they were ready to assist the German army in the destruction of the atheistic Soviet state.
In the occupied territory, thousands of churches, churches, and houses of worship of various Protestant movements (primarily Lutherans and Pentecostals) resumed their activities. This process was especially active in the Baltic states, in the Vitebsk, Gomel, Mogilev regions of Belarus, in the Dnepropetrovsk, Zhitomir, Zaporozhye, Kiev, Voroshilovgrad, Poltava regions of Ukraine, in the Rostov, Smolensk regions of the RSFSR.
The religious factor was taken into account when planning domestic policy in areas where Islam traditionally spread, primarily in the Crimea and the Caucasus. German propaganda declared respect for the values of Islam, presented the occupation as the liberation of peoples from the “Bolshevik godless yoke,” and guaranteed the creation of conditions for the revival of Islam. The occupiers willingly opened mosques in almost every settlement of the “Muslim regions” and provided the Muslim clergy with the opportunity to address believers through radio and print. Throughout the occupied territory where Muslims lived, the positions of mullahs and senior mullahs were restored, whose rights and privileges were equal to the heads of administrations of cities and towns.
When forming special units from among prisoners of war of the Red Army, much attention was paid to religious affiliation: if representatives of peoples who traditionally professed Christianity were mainly sent to the “army of General Vlasov”, then to such formations as the “Turkestan Legion”, “Idel-Ural” representatives of “Islamic” peoples.
The “liberalism” of the German authorities did not apply to all religions. Many communities found themselves on the verge of destruction, for example, in Dvinsk alone, almost all of the 35 synagogues operating before the war were destroyed, and up to 14 thousand Jews were shot. Most of the Evangelical Christian Baptist communities that found themselves in the occupied territory were also destroyed or dispersed by the authorities.
Forced to leave the occupied territories under the pressure of Soviet troops, the Nazi invaders took away liturgical objects, icons, paintings, books, and items made of precious metals from prayer buildings.
According to far from complete data from the Extraordinary State Commission to establish and investigate the atrocities of the Nazi invaders, 1,670 Orthodox churches, 69 chapels, 237 churches, 532 synagogues, 4 mosques and 254 other prayer buildings were completely destroyed, looted or desecrated in the occupied territory. Among those destroyed or desecrated by the Nazis were priceless monuments of history, culture and architecture, incl. dating back to the 11th-17th centuries, in Novgorod, Chernigov, Smolensk, Polotsk, Kyiv, Pskov. Many prayer buildings were converted by the occupiers into prisons, barracks, stables, and garages.
Position and patriotic activities of the Russian Orthodox Church during the war
June 22, 1941 Patriarchal Locum Tenens Metropolitan. Sergius (Stragorodsky) compiled the “Message to the Pastors and Flock of Christ’s Orthodox Church,” in which he revealed the anti-Christian essence of fascism and called on believers to defend themselves. In their letters to the Patriarchate, believers reported on the widespread voluntary collection of donations for the needs of the front and defense of the country.
After the death of Patriarch Sergius, according to his will, Metropolitan took over as locum tenens of the patriarchal throne. Alexy (Simansky), unanimously elected at the last meeting of the Local Council on January 31-February 2, 1945, Patriarch of Moscow and All Rus'. The Council was attended by Patriarchs Christopher II of Alexandria, Alexander III of Antioch and Kallistratus of Georgia (Tsintsadze), representatives of the Constantinople, Jerusalem, Serbian and Romanian patriarchs.
In 1945, the so-called Estonian schism was overcome, and the Orthodox parishes and clergy of Estonia were accepted into communion with the Russian Orthodox Church.
Patriotic activities of communities of other faiths and religions
Immediately after the start of the war, the leaders of almost all religious associations of the USSR supported the liberation struggle of the peoples of the country against the Nazi aggressor. Addressing believers with patriotic messages, they called upon them to honorably fulfill their religious and civic duty to protect the Fatherland and provide all possible material assistance to the needs of the front and rear. The leaders of most religious associations of the USSR condemned those representatives of the clergy who deliberately went over to the side of the enemy and helped to impose a “new order” in the occupied territory.
The head of the Russian Old Believers of the Belokrinitsky hierarchy, Archbishop. Irinarch (Parfyonov), in his Christmas message of 1942, called on the Old Believers, a considerable number of whom fought on the fronts, to serve valiantly in the Red Army and resist the enemy in the occupied territory in the ranks of the partisans. In May 1942, the leaders of the Unions of Baptists and Evangelical Christians addressed a letter of appeal to believers; the appeal spoke of the danger of fascism “for the cause of the Gospel” and called on “brothers and sisters in Christ” to fulfill “their duty to God and to the Motherland” by being “the best warriors at the front and the best workers in the rear.” Baptist communities were engaged in sewing linen, collecting clothes and other things for soldiers and families of the dead, helped in caring for the wounded and sick in hospitals, and looked after orphans in orphanages. Using funds raised in Baptist communities, the Good Samaritan ambulance plane was built to transport seriously wounded soldiers to the rear. The leader of renovationism, A. I. Vvedensky, repeatedly made patriotic appeals.
In relation to a number of other religious associations, state policy during the war years remained invariably tough. First of all, this concerned “anti-state, anti-Soviet and fanatical sects,” which included the Doukhobors
- http://www.pravenc.ru/text/150063.html
Know, Soviet people, that you are descendants of fearless warriors!
Know, Soviet people, that the blood of great heroes flows in you,
Those who gave their lives for their homeland without thinking about the benefits!
Know and honor, Soviet people, the exploits of our grandfathers and fathers!
Among historical events over which time has no power, a special place belongs to the Battle of Moscow, within the framework of which a counteroffensive took place near Moscow. In the harsh days of the autumn of 1941, when the question of the very existence of our state arose with all urgency, the answer to it depended on whether or not Moscow would withstand the onslaught of the German Wehrmacht. His motorized and army corps, which had not yet known a single defeat in World War II, swept away all obstacles in their path, broke through the strategic front and, having surrounded significant forces of three Soviet fronts near Vyazma and Bryansk, rushed to Moscow.
In such a dramatic situation, it seemed that the worst and irreparable thing would happen. At that time, not only enemies, but also friends of our country had no doubt that the fate of Moscow was predetermined, and its fall was a matter of the next few days.
However, contrary to all the gloomy forecasts, this did not happen. The defenders of the capital, together with the residents of Moscow and the Moscow region, heroically fighting the enemy, turned the city into an impregnable fortress. They fought the invaders day and night, at the front and surrounded, in the enemy rear and in the skies of the capital. By stubborn defense of their positions, counterattacks and counterstrikes, the introduction of fresh reserves and air strikes, they exhausted the enemy forces. And so, when the Germans approached the suburbs of the capital and could already see life on the city streets through binoculars...
Soviet troops went from defense to counteroffensive
The Soviet command, preparing a counteroffensive, tried to do everything possible to hide its intentions from the enemy. The planning of the operation at the fronts was carried out by an extremely limited circle of people, and the combat documents for it were personally developed by the chief of staff of the front. Army commanders were warned that with the directive they received:
“Only the member of the Military Council and the Chief of Staff should be informed about the transition to a counteroffensive. To give instructions to the executors insofar as they are concerned.”
Any negotiations about the upcoming counter-offensive via technical communications were prohibited.
However, it was unlikely to completely conceal such a large-scale regrouping of troops from the enemy, while being in direct contact with him. Indeed, as captured and other documents testify, the information received by the German side from human, air and other types of intelligence allowed it to paint a relatively complete picture of the position of the Red Army and the plans of its command. The reports noted the advance of large Russian forces to the north and south of Moscow. But, despite the alarming nature of these messages, they did not receive adequate assessments from the German command. Continuing to remain captive of its own illusions, it believed that the Russians were no longer able to bring significant forces into battle, and the fact of the appearance of fresh units near Moscow was regarded as a normal regrouping of troops from passive to active sectors to counter the German offensive. On December 4, the commander of Army Group Center, Field Marshal Feodor von Bock, responded to one of these intelligence reports as follows:
“...The enemy’s combat capabilities are not so great that he could use these forces...to launch a large counter-offensive at the present time.”
The German command turned a blind eye to the increased resistance of the Soviet troops and their increased activity. Only by the fatigue of its personnel, and most importantly by the influence of weather conditions, did it explain the fact that the German troops, unable to withstand the counterattacks, were thrown back at Yakhroma, Kubinka, Naro-Fominsk, Kashira, Tula and in other areas.
Cavalrymen of the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps of the 16th Army of the Western Front, in the center with a map in their hands - the commander of the Guard Corps, Major General Lev Mikhailovich Dovator
Balance of forces and means on December 5, 1941
| Strengths and means |
Soviet troops |
Nazi troops |
Ratio |
| Personnel, thousand people |
1100 |
1708 |
|
| Guns and mortars, units |
7652 |
13500 |
|
| Tanks, units |
1170 |
||
| Airplanes, units |
1000 |
Contrary to his recent declarations such as “even before the start of winter, the enemy will be defeated”, “the enemy will never rise again,” Hitler this time declared that the cold winter was to blame for all the troubles of the Wehrmacht near Moscow, which, moreover, came too early. However, such argumentation is not convincing. After all, the average temperature in the Moscow region, and this is evidenced by the daily operational reports of Army Group Center, was kept at minus 4-6°C in November. On the contrary, frozen swamps, streams, small rivers, together with the still shallow snow cover, dramatically improved the cross-country conditions of German tanks and motorized units, which were able to operate off-road without getting bogged down in the mud, and to reach the flanks and rear of the Soviet troops. These conditions were close to ideal. True, from December 5 to 7, when the mercury dropped to minus 30-38 ° C, the position of the troops noticeably worsened. But the very next day the temperature rose to zero. Consequently, the Fuhrer’s motivation reveals his desire to hide the truth about the situation on the eastern front, to relieve himself of responsibility for the unpreparedness of his troops to operate in winter conditions, and most importantly, to preserve the impeccable prestige of the political and military leadership of the Reich.
Meanwhile, the Red Army's counteroffensive continued to gain momentum. The troops of the right wing of the Western Front, interacting with the Kalinin Front, attacked the Klin-Solnechnogorsk and Kalinin groupings of the enemy, and the adjacent flanks of the Western and Southwestern Fronts attacked its 2nd Tank and 2nd Field Armies.
Troops of the 30th Army under the command of Major General D.D. Lelyushenko, having broken through the defense front of the 3rd Tank Group with his center, approached Klin from the northeast. Here the Germans offered especially stubborn resistance. The fact is that the entry of Soviet troops to the near approaches to Klin created the threat of a deep flank attack on the German troops operating northwest of Moscow. That is why the German command had to hastily strengthen its Klin group by transferring troops from other areas. Already on December 7, units of six tank divisions began to be transferred to the Klin area. This circumstance led to a slowdown in the advance of the 30th Army, but it made it easier for other troops of the right wing of the Western Front to conduct combat operations.
And, nevertheless, the rate of advance of the Soviet troops remained very low: it was only 1.5-4 km per day. The advancing formations were drawn into battles to capture strongholds hastily created by the Germans in populated areas, road junctions and at dominant heights, but, unfortunately, they acted extremely ineptly. Even those of them who showed themselves excellently in defensive battles did not have time to master the art of conducting offensive combat.
In the Kalinin direction, the counteroffensive developed even more slowly. 29th Army under the command of Lieutenant General I.I. Maslennikova, instead of delivering one blow, launched an offensive simultaneously on three sectors of the front, moreover, 7-8 km away from each other. Each of the three advancing divisions attacked along a 1.5-kilometer front. The attacking units penetrated the enemy’s defenses, but, being swept by enemy fire from both flanks, were forced to stop. The next day, the Germans launched strong counterattacks and again pushed the Soviet units back to the left bank of the Volga. Essentially, by the end of the fifth day of fighting, the formations of the 29th Army remained on the same lines from which they began the offensive. On the contrary, the 31st Army, whose commander was Major General V.A. Yushkevich achieved success. It captured bridgeheads on the right bank of the Volga and by the end of December 9 had advanced 10-12 km, cutting the Kalinin-Turginovo highway and thereby creating a threat to the rear of the enemy group in Kalinin.
At the same time, the armies of the right wing of the Western Front continued to advance. By the end of December 12, they had advanced another 7-16 km. Now the front line passed northwest, north and east of Klin and came close to the Istrinsky reservoir, the river. Istra. The cities of Solnechnogorsk and Istra were liberated.
The Germans, trying to prevent the advance of Soviet troops, blew up the dam. The offensive stopped. In order to hold the roads leading to the west and ensure the withdrawal of the main forces of the 3rd and 4th tank groups to the Volokolamsk-Ruza line, the enemy continued to fight stubbornly in the area of Klin and the Istra reservoir.
The Soviet command strengthened its troops and regrouped, but the offensive generally did not develop quickly enough. The actions of formations and units continued to be dominated by frontal attacks on fortified enemy strongholds, rather than encircling them through envelopments. This is why Army General G.K. Zhukov, with a directive of December 13, again demanded from the right wing armies:
“to complete the defeat of the enemy with a relentless and energetic offensive, and the 30th and 1st shock armies were to encircle the enemy in the Klin area with part of their forces.”
The commander of the Western Front categorically prohibited frontal attacks on fortified enemy resistance centers. He ordered:
“carry out the pursuit quickly, not allowing the enemy to break away. Make widespread use of strong forward detachments to capture road junctions, gorges, and disrupt the enemy’s marching and combat formations.”
Since December 11, formations of the 16th Army of the Western Front under the command of General K.K. Rokossovsky tried to overcome the Istra Reservoir. However, after the explosion of the dam, the ice dropped by 3-4 m and was covered with a half-meter layer of water near the western shore. In addition, on this coast, which was a rather serious natural obstacle, units of five enemy divisions took up defensive positions. To advance bypassing the reservoir from the north and the river from the south, General Rokossovsky formed two mobile groups. One group was led by General F.T. Remizov, the other - General M.E. Katukov. Commander of the Western Front, General G.K. Zhukov transferred the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps of General L.M. to strengthen the 5th Army. Dovator, two separate tank battalions and other units.
For the development of the offensive on the right wing of the Western Front, the use of mobile groups was of utmost importance. Using their maneuverability, they launched sudden and daring attacks on the enemy’s flanks, even reaching their rear. Particularly impressive results at this stage of the counteroffensive were achieved by the mobile group L.M. Dovatora. This is evidenced not only by the reporting documents of the Soviet headquarters, but also by the operational reports of Army Group Center.
Despite the difficulties and shortcomings, the counteroffensive developed successfully. During the 11 days of the offensive, the troops of the Western Front advanced on their right wing from 30 to 65 km, their average pace was almost 6 km per day. The troops of the left wing of the Kalinin Front covered a distance of 10 to 22 km. Their average pace did not exceed 0.8-1.8 km per day. So, on the near approaches to Moscow, to the north and north-west of it, the selected Wehrmacht troops suffered a significant defeat for the first time and were forced to retreat with heavy losses.
During these same days, the troops of the left wing of the Western Front achieved greater successes than those formations that operated to the north and north-west of the capital. Three main circumstances determined this achievement.
Firstly, unfortunate location of Colonel General G. Guderian’s formations.
Secondly, skillful use by the command of the Western Front of the created situation. The main blow was delivered to a weak point in the enemy’s operational formation - to the flank and rear of his main group.
Third, an offensive with the movement of troops from the depths, directly from the concentration area, ensured the surprise of the attack.
General F.I. Golikov (left)
L.M. Dovator
L.M. Dovator (right)
P.A. Belov (left)
Taking advantage of the favorable situation, formations of the 10th Army under the command of General F.I. Golikov knocked the enemy out of a number of settlements and by the end of December 7 they had advanced almost 30 km into the enemy’s position. At that moment, the Soviet command faced the prospect of not only dismembering, but also encircling part of the forces of G. Guderian’s tank army east of Tula. In order to prevent encirclement, General G. Guderian hastened to give the troops the order to withdraw to the line of the Shat and Don rivers.
Meanwhile, the enemy increased resistance in other areas. By December 9, he brought the 112th Infantry Division into battle, which, together with the withdrawn units, took up defense along the western bank of the river. Shat, Shat reservoir and river. Don. Relying on these natural obstacles, the Germans stopped the 10th Army, parts of which by that time had managed to advance to a depth of 60 km. However, all attempts by its formations to overcome this position were in vain.
On December 8, Army General G.K. Zhukov gave the order: through the joint efforts of the troops of the Belov group and the 50th Army, to encircle and destroy the German group operating south of Tula, and the 10th Army to strike at Plavsk. An analysis of the implementation of this order shows that Soviet troops were unable to intercept the enemy’s escape routes from the pocket east of Tula. The high pace of retreat with the simultaneous use of natural obstacles and barriers along the offensive routes of the Soviet troops allowed Guderian's divisions not only to avoid encirclement in that area, but also to stop the 10th Army.
Meanwhile, the offensive of the left wing of the Western Front continued to develop. At dawn on December 14, Belov's group liberated the Uzlovaya station, and the next day - Dedilovo. On the same day, troops of the 10th Army took Bogoroditsk by storm, continuing the offensive towards Plavsk. But the main thing is that on December 14, another army joined the counteroffensive - the 49th, led by General I.G. Zakharkin, with the task of defeating the enemy’s Aleksin group. By the end of December 16, it had advanced from 5 to 15 km, covering the troops of the 50th Army on the right.
In the zone of the right wing of the Southwestern Front, the 2nd German Army operated under the command of General R. Schmidt, which advanced until December 6, and therefore did not have a prepared defense.
On December 6, the 13th Army of General A.M. began operating in the direction of the auxiliary attack. Gorodnyansky. On the first day, its troops did not achieve any significant territorial success, but they diverted the enemy’s attention from the direction of the main attack of the front, forcing the German command to withdraw part of its forces from here to counter the formations of the 13th Army. This made it possible for the front strike group, led by General Kostenko, to launch a surprise attack on the weakened German group on the morning of December 7. On the same day, the 13th Army began fighting directly for the city of Yelets. The enemy put up stubborn resistance, but on the night of December 9, under the threat of encirclement, its units began to leave the city. Yelets was released. The next day, the army troops were advancing throughout the entire zone. The Germans' attempts to detain them were unsuccessful. On December 10, units of Lieutenant General A.M. Gorodnyansky advanced from 6 to 16 km, and the enemy hastily retreated in the western and northwestern directions.
To successfully encircle the enemy units retreating to the northwest, it was necessary to first solve two main problems:
increase the pace of attack; change the direction of attacks of the 13th Army and the Kostenko group, aiming them at the Upper River.
On the whole, the general situation was favorable to this. Carrying out the assigned tasks, troops under the command of generals A.M. Gorodnyansky and F.Ya. By the end of December 12, Kostenko had half surrounded the Yelets enemy group. Its complete encirclement was completed by the end of the 16th, when the left flank formations of the 3rd Army reached the village. Sudbischi.
Enemy units, trying to break through to the west, repeatedly launched counterattacks. With their active actions they often put the troops of the F.Ya. group in a difficult position. Kostenko. Thus, individual units of the enemy’s 34th Army Corps managed to reach the communications of the 5th Cavalry Corps of General V.D. Kryuchenkin and interrupt his supply. However, soon the front forces almost completely defeated the 34th Army Corps, and its remnants were thrown back to the west. The morale of the German soldiers fell so low that the commander of the 2nd Army, General Schmidt, was forced to give the order to identify individuals who dared to engage in defeatist talk, and to immediately shoot them as a clear example to others.
At the same time, the troops of Marshal S.K. Timoshenko, which inflicted a serious defeat on the 2nd Army, advanced 80-100 km to the west. In addition, they also diverted part of the forces of the 2nd Tank Army, thereby making it easier for the troops of the left wing of the Western Front to complete the task.
The counteroffensive near Moscow was already in its eighth day, and there were no reports of it. Thoughts about the impending disaster hanging over the capital weighed heavily on people, and the unknown only increased their anxiety for the fate of their beloved city. And on the night of December 13, a message from the Sovinformburo was heard on the radio:
“At the last hour. The failure of the German plan to encircle and occupy Moscow." It revealed for the first time the enemy’s plans and spoke of the failure of the “second general offensive against Moscow.”
By this time, Soviet troops had defeated the enemy's tank strike groups and, having advanced from the starting line north of the capital by 60 km, and south by 120 km, eliminated the immediate danger to Moscow. In other words, the troops of three fronts completed their immediate task and achieved the main goal of the counteroffensive:
On December 16, the Soviet command ordered the continuation of the pursuit of the enemy. The troops were determined by the milestones they had to achieve, as well as the deadlines for completing tasks and how to solve them. At the same time, the width of the offensive front and the composition of the troops involved increased due to the right wing of the Kalinin, the center of the Western and the right wing of the South-Western fronts.
Headquarters continuously coordinated the efforts of the fronts. After analyzing the orders given, she found that if the Southwestern Front went on the offensive on December 18, it would clearly be 100 km behind the adjacent wing of the Western Front. Therefore, Headquarters offered Marshal S.K. Timoshenko to speed up the timing of the offensive of the right flank of the Southwestern Front. In accordance with the instructions received from S.K. Timoshenko ordered the 61st Army with part of its forces to go on the offensive on December 16, that is, two days earlier. For this purpose, a mobile group was formed led by General K.I. Novik.
The Soviet ski battalion moves to the front line during the Battle of Moscow.
After the battle in the Moscow region. These are the positions of German troops - four ZB vz light machine guns are visible. 26 of Czech production, which were in service with the Wehrmacht.
Soviet fighting dogs in winter capes.
Noteworthy is the pace with which the armies of the right wing of the Western Front had to advance. The headquarters set it at 10-15 km per day, and G.K. Zhukov increased it to 20-25 km per day, that is, almost doubling, although in those conditions it was almost impossible to achieve such a pace.
At the same time, a number of important decisions were made by the Wehrmacht High Command. On December 16, Hitler ordered the troops of Army Group Center to hold out until the last possible opportunity in order to gain time to improve transport links and bring up reserves. Having decided to hold the front at all costs, Hitler on December 16 came to the conclusion that it was necessary to replace both Brauchitsch and Bock, who, in his opinion, would not be able to cope with the crisis situation. An analysis of these decisions shows that the Wehrmacht High Command realized only by mid-December the full extent of the danger looming over Army Group Center. Only 12 days after the start of the counteroffensive of Soviet troops near Moscow, it became convinced that their actions did not lead to tactical breakthroughs of local significance, but to a breakthrough of a strategic scale. As a result, there was a threat of defeat of the largest strategic grouping of the Wehrmacht. The severity of the situation was aggravated by the fact that its formations could withdraw only by abandoning heavy weapons, and without them the German troops would not have been able to hold the rear positions to which they were retreating.
However, objectively assessing the state and capabilities of resistance of Army Group Center, it should be noted that with the reduction of the front line, the position of the German troops improved somewhat. By the moment under consideration, the density of the 3rd and 4th Panzer Groups had increased by 1.4 times, and the Guderian Army Group by 1.8 times. That is why the troops of Army Group Center had a real opportunity to conduct a stubborn defense and provide fairly active resistance to the advancing Red Army. That’s why Hitler’s demand for the troops to provide fanatical resistance in their positions seems completely justified, since it corresponded to the current situation and the combat potential of the German troops. Having removed Brauchitsch from the post of commander-in-chief of the ground forces, Hitler himself decided to become the head of the ground forces and personally lead all measures to save the eastern front.
The second stage of the Red Army's counteroffensive near Moscow
All these important events that occurred in mid-December had a significant impact on the nature of the fighting. Under the influence of the factors considered, the second stage of the Red Army’s counteroffensive near Moscow began. The troops of the left wing of the Kalinin Front continued their offensive in the southern and southwestern directions.
On December 16, the commander of the Kalinin Front, General Konev, gave an order according to which the 30th and 31st armies were to advance from the east to Staritsa, and the 22nd and 29th armies from the north, delivering the main attacks with their adjacent flanks. During these actions, it was intended not only to defeat most of the troops of the 9th Army, but also to create conditions for a subsequent attack on the flank and rear of the main forces of Army Group Center.
To implement the plan of I.S. Konev required the armies of the left wing of the front to quickly advance to Staritsa. However, the command of the 30th Army failed to create the necessary grouping in a short time.
Its main forces entered the battle only on December 19. The offensive of the neighboring 31st Army also proceeded very slowly. By the 20th, she had not completed the difficult turn to the west, continuing to advance to the southwest. By the end of December 20, both armies had advanced only 12-15 km, and the rate of advance did not exceed 3-4 km per day.
However, the commander of the Kalinin Front, Colonel General I.S. Konev did not consider it possible to abandon active actions in the Torzhok-Rzhev direction. He ordered its commander, General I.I. Maslennikov go on the offensive with two divisions, continuing to pull up the remaining six. Having completed the concentration of formations, the army intensified the onslaught and by the end of December, interacting with the left-flank divisions of the 22nd Army of General V.I. Vostrukhova, made her way into the depths of the enemy defense at 15-20 km.
By this time, the troops of the 29th and 31st armies had inflicted a serious defeat on the enemy and reached the approaches to Staritsa. The Germans turned this city, located on the steep banks of the Volga, into a powerful center of resistance, but could not hold it. Under the pressure of the troops of General V.I. Shvetsov's units of the 6th Army Corps were forced to hastily leave Staritsa. The enemy's attempts to correct the situation were unsuccessful. Soviet divisions rushed to Rzhev. The successful advance of the troops of the right wing and center of the Kalinin Front put the enemy in a difficult position. After all, the continuation of the struggle northeast of Rzhev created a threat of a breakthrough in the defense in the center of the 9th Army. However, even in this situation, and on January 2, Hitler did not give permission for the withdrawal of troops from this army.
By January 7, formations of the 22nd and 39th armies broke enemy resistance and reached the river line. Volga, the railway west of Rzhev, opening the way for an attack on Vyazma. By this time, using the success of the 39th Army, they developed an offensive in the direction of Rzhev and hovered over the Rzhev enemy group from the northeast of the 29th Army, and from the east - the 31st Army. As for the 30th Army, its advance was still minimal. Thus, at the second stage of the counteroffensive, the troops of the Kalinin Front dealt another blow to the 9th German Army, forcing it to retreat 50-60 km in the Torzhok-Rzhev direction, and 90-100 km in the Kalinin-Rzhev direction. On the right wing they reached the line of the Volga, in the center they surrounded Rzhev in a semicircle. Relative to the main forces of Army Group Center, the front continued to occupy an enveloping position. All this created the preconditions for the development of an offensive towards Vyazma. In accordance with the instructions of the Headquarters, the Kalinin Front began to regroup troops in the interests of the new operation.
The troops of the right wing of the Western Front continued to pursue the enemy on the morning of December 17, with the task of reaching the Zubtsov-Gzhatsk line, that is, 112-120 km west of the line they had reached by that time. The German command, covering the retreat with strong rearguards, withdrew the main forces of tank groups to an intermediate position prepared along the banks of the Lama and Ruza rivers, while barriers were widely used, especially in populated areas and at road junctions. In many sectors of the front, the enemy retreated randomly, abandoning weapons, equipment and vehicles.
German soldiers freezing in the snow near Moscow.
Captured German motorcycles captured by Soviet troops during the Battle of Moscow.
Soviet officers inspect captured weapons in front of a line of captured German soldiers. Battle for Moscow.
Troops of the 1st Shock Army of General V.I. Kuznetsova On December 18, they took the large stronghold of Teryaev Sloboda in battle and reached the line of the river. Big Sister, having advanced more than 20 km. The 20th Army, pursuing the enemy with parts of the mobile group of Major General F.T. Remizov, advanced westward by about 20 km and by the end of December 18 reached a line 18 km east of Volokolamsk. On December 19, troops of the 20th Army began fighting for Volokolamsk. At the same time, the group of F.T. Remizov together with the 64th Naval Rifle Brigade, Colonel I.M. Chistyakova attacked the city from the north and east, and the group of Colonel M.E. Katukova - from the southwest.
Under the threat of encirclement, the enemy's 35th Infantry Division, covered by rearguards, began to hastily retreat to the western bank of the river at dawn on December 20. Lama. On the shoulders of the retreating Germans, units of both mobile groups and Pacific sailors burst into Volokolamsk and with decisive actions knocked out the enemy’s rearguard from it. Thus, the enemy lost a major stronghold in his defense system at the Lama line.
By this time, the 16th Army of General K.K. Rokossovsky went to the river. Ruse, but, having met stubborn enemy resistance, could not advance further. 5th Army of General L.A. During December 19 and 20, Govorova fought fierce battles on her right flank and in the center with enemy units that had retreated beyond the Ruza and Moscow rivers. With well-organized artillery, mortar and machine gun fire, the Germans put up stubborn resistance at this natural line and on the approaches to the city of Ruza. All attempts by army units to break through its defenses and liberate the city ended in failure. Here, on the approaches to Ruza, near the village. Palashkino On December 19, the commander of the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps, General L.M., was killed. Dovator.
So, at the second stage of the counteroffensive, the armies of the right wing of the Western Front advanced another 40 km, which was approximately 1.5 times less than in the first stage. The reasons are that the offensive capabilities of the armies have dried up, the surprise factor has exhausted itself, and the enemy managed to organize a fairly strong defense at the intermediate line. Attempts to overcome it immediately were unsuccessful.
At a time when the troops of the right wing of the Western Front began preparing for an operation to break through enemy defenses, the main events unfolded on its left wing. In the process of completing the offensive near Tula, the front command directed troops for subsequent actions in the northwestern and western directions. On the evening of December 16, General Zhukov ordered the 10th, 49th, 50th armies and Belov's group to continue the non-stop pursuit of the enemy and liberate Kaluga.
In implementing the assigned tasks, the troops of the left wing of the Western Front increased pressure on the enemy. Under their pressure, the enemy's 2nd Tank Army withdrew with its main forces in a southwestern direction to Orel, and with its left flank to the west. A gap formed between these groups, the width of which reached 30 km by the evening of December 17. G.K. Zhukov, deciding to use the gap in the enemy’s front to quickly capture Kaluga with a blow from the south, ordered the commander of the 50th Army, General I.V. Boldin to create a mobile group. At the same time, Belov’s group was supposed to quickly reach the Oka River, cross it north of Belev and, then turning the main forces to the northwest, capture Yukhnov on December 28 and thus cut off the enemy’s escape route from Kaluga and Maloyaroslavets. The 10th Army received orders to quickly occupy Belyov and Sukhinichi. Zhukov pursued the goal of depriving the Germans of the opportunity to gain a foothold on intermediate lines and hold the most important road junctions.
Created in the 50th Army for the liberation of Kaluga, a mobile group consisting of rifle, tank and cavalry divisions, as well as the Tula workers' regiment and a tank battalion under the command of General B.C. Popova began her task on the night of December 18. Bypassing populated areas and not getting involved in battles with the enemy, by the end of December 20, she secretly approached Kaluga from the south.
On the morning of December 21, parts of the mobile group V.S. Popov captured the bridge over the Oka, broke into Kaluga and started street battles with the city’s garrison. The German command sought to retain Kaluga at all costs. As a result of active actions by superior enemy forces, Popov’s group was soon dismembered. She had to fight surrounded by battles, which became protracted and lasted until the end of December.
The forced withdrawal of the 43rd Army Corps to Kaluga led to the fact that the gap between the adjacent flanks of the 4th Field and 2nd Tank Armies widened even more. Belov’s group was sent into this gap, which on December 24 reached the Oka River south of Likhvin (now Chekalin). The advance of the group and the exit of its units to the Oka had a favorable effect on the actions of the left flank formations of the 50th Army, since the threat of an attack from the south was eliminated. The army quickly advanced to Likhvin and liberated the city on December 26. Now its left-flank divisions were able to cover Kaluga from the southwest. By this time, the right-flank formations of the army were fighting with the enemy to the east and southeast of Kaluga, trying to cover it also from the northeast. On December 30, after ten days of intense fighting, Popov’s group, together with the approaching units of the 290th and 258th rifle divisions, cleared the ancient Russian city of Kaluga from the invaders.
The last to launch a counteroffensive were the troops operating in the center of the Western Front. It should be noted that the conditions here turned out to be the most unfavorable for this compared to those they were on the flanks of the Western Front. German troops relied on a previously prepared defensive line. It was built over the course of two months and by mid-December had fully equipped strongholds with full profile trenches, dugouts and communication passages. There were anti-tank and anti-personnel barriers, mainly mine-explosive ones, as well as a well-organized fire system with a sufficient supply of shells, mines, and cartridges. Most of the formations of the 4th Field Army defending in this sector did not conduct active combat operations for a month, and therefore suffered the least losses. In addition, the operational density of its troops, amounting to 5.4 km per division, turned out to be the highest in Army Group Center.
On the morning of December 18, after an hour of artillery preparation, the troops of the center of the Western Front went on the offensive. Some units of the 33rd Army of General M.G. Efremov managed to cross to the western bank of the river. Nary north of Naro-Fominsk, but they were driven back by an enemy counterattack. The next day, the 110th Infantry Division part of its forces crossed to the western bank of the river near the village. Elagino (3 km south of Naro-Fominsk) and started fighting there. December 20 General M.G. Efremov brought the 201st Rifle Division into the battle. However, this maneuver did not change the situation. Protracted battles took place on the same lines. Only the 222nd Infantry Division managed to capture a small bridgehead on the western bank of the Nara near the village of Tashirovo on December 21.
Nevertheless, the situation began to change in a direction favorable for the armies of the center of the Western Front. The fact is that as a result of the offensive of the left wing of this front and the withdrawal of German troops to Kaluga, a gap formed between the 13th and 43rd Army Corps in the enemy’s zone of action. The left flank formations of the 49th Army of General I.G. immediately rushed into this gap. Zakharkina. By the end of December 22, they had advanced 52 km and created a threat of envelopment by the 4th German Army from the south.
The beginning of the withdrawal of German troops served Army General G.K. Zhukov was given a reason to give the order to General Efremov to increase pressure on the enemy. The battles for Naro-Fominsk flared up with renewed vigor. Overcoming fierce enemy opposition from part of the 222nd Infantry Division, Colonel F.A. Bobrov captured the city from the north, and the 1st Guards Motorized Rifle Division, Colonel S.I. Iovleva - from the southwest. On December 26, Naro-Fominsk was taken. On the same day, Zhukov gave the order to pursue the enemy in the Mozhaisk and Maloyaroslavets directions. On December 28, Balabanovo was liberated, and on January 2, Maloyaroslavets.
Fiercely resisting, the Germans did not allow the formations of the right flank and center of the 33rd Army to advance west of Naro-Fominsk. For three days and three nights, five rifle divisions of the 33rd and 43rd armies fought exceptionally fierce street battles before they were able to clear Borovsk, which covered the approaches to the Minsk highway from the south, from the enemy. This happened on January 4, and in the next four days, adjacent formations of the same armies advanced another 10-25 km, but due to stubborn resistance and powerful counterattacks of units of the 20th and formations of the 7th and 9th who came to their aid The enemy army corps were forced to stop. By January 7, 1942, the Red Army's counteroffensive was over.
The victory near Moscow was won by the courage and steadfastness of the Russian soldier
So, in December 1941, a most significant event took place near Moscow: for the first time in World War II, the Red Army troops stopped and then inflicted a major defeat on the German army, which had until then considered itself invincible and, throwing it back 100-250 km from Moscow, removed the threat to the capital and Moscow industrial region. This success was indisputable and extremely important, and its significance went far beyond the scope of a purely military task.
After all, it was near Moscow that the Germans not only began to lose strategic initiative and learned the bitterness of defeat, but, and this is the main thing, they lost their “lightning war” against the Soviet Union. The collapse of the Blitzkrieg strategy confronted the Third Reich with the prospect of a long, protracted war. Such a war required its rulers to restructure the Barbarossa plan, new strategic planning for the coming years and the additional search for enormous material resources. Germany was not ready for a protracted war. To carry it out, it was necessary to radically restructure the country's economy, its domestic and foreign policy, not to mention its strategy.
The defeat near Moscow was measured by other criteria.
“The myth of the invincibility of the German army is broken,” wrote Halder. - With the onset of summer, the German army will achieve new victories in Russia, but this will no longer restore the myth of its invincibility. Therefore, December 6, 1941 can be considered a turning point, and one of the most fatal moments in the short history of the Third Reich. Hitler's strength and power reached their apogee, from that moment on they began to decline...”
What makes this success of the Red Army especially significant is that it was achieved with an unfavorable balance of forces and means for the offensive. However, the Soviet command managed to compensate for this deficiency due to the successful choice of the moment of launching a counteroffensive, when the enemy stopped, but had not yet had time to go on the defensive and build defensive positions, as well as due to the surprise of the counteroffensive. The enemy, unprepared to parry unexpected attacks, found himself in unfavorable conditions; he had to hastily change plans and adapt to the actions of the Red Army. It was surprise that was one of the most important conditions for a successful counteroffensive at its first stage. In addition, success was achieved through the use of additional forces. To develop the counteroffensive, 2 combined arms armies, 26 rifle and 8 cavalry divisions, 10 rifle brigades, 12 separate ski battalions and about 180 thousand marching reinforcements were brought in.
All these factors, as well as the losses suffered by the enemy, especially in military equipment, and the lack of operational reserves caused a change in the balance of forces and means of the parties. As a result, by the end of the counteroffensive it was equal in terms of artillery, and in terms of people and tanks it became in favor of the western fronts by 1.1 and 1.4 times, respectively.
The decisive factor in achieving victory over the invaders in the counteroffensive near Moscow was the high morale of the Soviet soldiers. The famous English military theorist and historian B. Liddell Hart emphasized that this victory was won:
“First of all, the courage and steadfastness of the Russian soldier, his ability to endure hardships and continuous battles in conditions that would finish off any Western army.”
And this is absolutely true.
In the December days of 1941, the people of the whole world learned that the Red Army could not only retreat, but was also capable of resisting the Wehrmacht troops. Undoubtedly there is something else:
the success near Moscow had a huge impact on the further course of both the Great Patriotic War and the entire Second World War as a whole.
Another very important event on a planetary scale took place: on January 1, 1942, representatives of 26 states signed the Declaration of the United Nations. All of them pledged to use their economic and military resources to fight against Germany, Italy, Japan and the countries that joined them, and in addition, to cooperate with each other and not to conclude a separate truce or peace with the states of the fascist bloc. This was the key to creating a favorable atmosphere for the systematic build-up of the military power of the anti-Hitler coalition.
The Battle of Moscow was marked by mass heroism and self-sacrifice of the Soviet people. For the valor and courage shown in battle, 40 units and formations were awarded the title of guards, 36 thousand soldiers were awarded orders and medals, 187 people were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union and Hero of the Russian Federation.
Killed German soldiers and abandoned German artillery during the December counteroffensive of the Red Army near Moscow. For added effect, a flock of crows has been added to the photo using editing.
By the beginning of December, the last assault on Moscow had exhausted itself, the German command had exhausted all its reserves and began to go on the defensive. The commander of the German 2nd Panzer Army, G. Guderian, was forced to admit that the offensive of Army Group Center on Moscow had failed. The Soviet command correctly identified this moment and launched a counterattack. On December 5-6, 1941, the counter-offensive of Soviet troops began in the Battle of Moscow. The offensive was attended by troops of the Kalinin Front under the command of Colonel General I. S. Konev, the Western Front under the command of Army General G. K. Zhukov and the right wing of the Southwestern Front - Marshal S. K. Timoshenko.
The fighting became fierce from the very beginning. On December 8, the Commander-in-Chief of the German armed forces, Adolf Hitler, was forced to sign Directive No. 39 on the transition to defense along the entire Soviet-German front. The Red Army, despite the lack of superiority in manpower, tanks and guns, and difficult natural conditions, already in the first days of the counteroffensive broke through the defenses of German troops south of Kalinin and north-west of Moscow, cutting the railway and the Kalinin-Moscow highway and liberating a number of settlements. It should be noted that the Soviet troops achieved victory, inferior to the enemy in the number of soldiers and technical equipment. Personnel: Red Army - 1.1 million people, Wehrmacht - 1.7 million (ratio 1:1.5); tanks: 744 versus 1170 (ratio in favor of the Germans 1:1.5); guns and mortars: 7652 versus 13500 (1:1.8).
Simultaneously with the troops that were advancing northwest of the Soviet capital, parts of the left wing of the Western and right wing of the Southwestern Front went on a counteroffensive. Powerful attacks by Soviet troops on the flank groups of the German Army Group Center, which were intended to cover and encircle Moscow, forced the enemy command to take measures to save their forces from complete defeat.
On December 9, 1941, the Red Army occupied Rogachevo, Venev and Yelets. On December 11, Soviet troops liberated Stalinogorsk, December 12 - Solnechnogorsk, December 13 - Efremov, December 15 - Klin, December 16 - Kalinin, December 20 - Volokolamsk. On December 25, the Red Army soldiers reached the Oka River on a broad front. On December 28, the enemy was driven out of Kozelsk, on December 30 from Kaluga, and at the beginning of January 1942, Meshchovsk and Mosalsk were liberated.
A woman meets Soviet soldiers who liberated her village. Winter 1941 - 1942
By the beginning of January 1942, units of the right wing of the Western Front made their way to the line of the Lama and Ruza rivers. By this time, the Kalinin Front had reached the Pavlikovo-Staritsa line. The troops of the central group of the Western Front occupied Naro-Fominsk on December 26, liberated Maloyaroslavets on January 2, and Borovsk on January 4. The offensive of the Soviet troops also developed successfully on the left wing of the Western Front, as well as in the Bryansk Front zone under the command of General Ya. T. Cherevichenko. In general, by January 7, 1942, the counteroffensive near Moscow was completed.
As a result of the Soviet counteroffensive near Moscow, a major event occurred - for the first time in World War II, the hitherto invincible Wehrmacht was stopped and then defeated by the Red Army. German troops were pushed back 100-250 kilometers from the Soviet capital, and the threat of enemy capture of the most important economic and transport center of the USSR and the Moscow industrial region was removed. The success was obvious, and its significance went far beyond the purely military task.
It was near Moscow that the Germans, for the first time in World War II, began to lose strategic initiative and received a strong blow; the “invincible” German soldiers wavered and ran. Berlin's strategic plan - "blitzkrieg" - was a complete failure. The Third Reich faced the threat of a long, protracted war of attrition, for which the German command was not prepared. The military-political leadership of the Reich had to urgently develop a new war plan, rebuild the economy for a long war, and find enormous material resources. This was a serious miscalculation by Berlin. The USSR turned out to be much stronger than the Nazis thought. Germany was not ready for a protracted war. To carry it out, it was necessary to radically restructure the entire German economy, its foreign and domestic policies, not to mention its military strategy.
The German army suffered huge losses in personnel and equipment during the Battle of Moscow. Thus, from the beginning of October 1941 to the end of March 1942, it lost about 650 thousand people killed, wounded and missing. For comparison, during the entire military campaign in the West in 1940, the Wehrmacht lost about 27 thousand people. During the period from October 1941 to March 1942, German troops lost 2,340 tanks near Moscow, while German industry was able to produce only 1,890 tanks. Aviation also suffered large losses, which could not be fully compensated by industry.
During the battle for Moscow, the strength and morale of the German army were broken. From that moment on, the power of the German machine began to decline, and the strength of the Red Army constantly increased. This strategic success is given particular significance by the fact that the victory was achieved with the Germans superior in manpower, tanks and guns (the Red Army had an advantage only in aviation). The Soviet command managed to compensate for the shortage of soldiers and weapons due to the successful timing of the transition to the offensive. The German offensive ran out of steam, the units were bleeding, exhausted by long battles, and their reserves were used up. The German command had not yet had time to switch to strategic defense and build defensive formations and prepare well-fortified positions. In addition, Moscow managed to achieve surprise in its offensive. The German command was confident that the Red Army was also drained of blood and could not deliver strong blows. The Germans were unprepared to parry an unexpected blow. As a result, the surprise of the attack became one of the main factors in the success of the counteroffensive. In addition, the Soviet command, in the conditions of a difficult battle for Moscow, was able to prepare reserves. Thus, to develop the counteroffensive, 2 armies, 26 rifle and 8 cavalry divisions, 10 rifle brigades, 12 separate ski battalions and about 180 thousand marching reinforcements were involved.
Another factor that led to the victory of the Red Army near Moscow was the high morale of Soviet soldiers. The courage, fortitude, tenacity of Soviet soldiers and commanders, the ability to emerge victorious in the most difficult conditions, allowed them to prevail over the Wehrmacht’s first-class combat vehicle.
The victory near Moscow also had enormous political and international significance. All the peoples of the world learned that the Red Army was capable of beating German troops. There is no doubt that the success near Moscow had a great influence on the further course of both the Great Patriotic War and the entire Second World War as a whole. This victory became the key to a systematic increase in the efforts of the entire anti-Hitler coalition. The prestige of Nazi Germany and its European allies fell sharply. The defeat of the Wehrmacht near Moscow had a sobering effect on the Japanese and Turkish ruling circles, from whom Berlin demanded an open action against the USSR. Japan and Turkey were waiting for the fall of Moscow to take the side of Germany, but now they again began to wait.
Several photographs illustrating the glorious counter-offensive of the Red Army near Moscow:
A German Mercedes-Benz L3000 truck, broken and abandoned during the retreat. Winter 1941 - 1942
Source: State Zelenograd Museum of History and Local Lore.
German cars abandoned during the retreat. Winter 1941 - 1942
A broken German convoy near the village of Kryukovo. Winter 1941 - 1942
A unit of Soviet skiers in the village of Kryukovo near Moscow. Winter 1941 - 1942
A group of German soldiers captured during the Battle of Moscow.
Abandoned during the German retreat was the Kubelwagen car (Volkswagen Tour 82 Kubelwagen). Winter 1941 - 1942
Soviet soldiers are examining a damaged and abandoned German Pz.Kpfw.III tank. Winter 1941 - 1942
The SdKfz 251/1 Hanomag armored personnel carrier abandoned during the German retreat. Winter 1941 - 1942
A Soviet soldier near an abandoned German 105-mm light field howitzer leFH18. Winter 1941 - 1942
Village children sit on the turret of a damaged and abandoned German Pz.Kpfw.III tank. Winter 1941 -1942
Soviet sapper clearing mines. Winter 1941 - 1942
German soldiers surrender to the Red Army during the Battle of Moscow. Winter 1941 - 1942
Soviet cavalrymen near a damaged and abandoned German Pz.Kpfw.III tank. Winter 1941 - 1942
Portrait of a Soviet officer during the Battle of Moscow. The officer is armed with a PPSh-41 submachine gun and two F-1 grenades.
Soviet cavalrymen in formation during the Battle of Moscow. Winter 1941 - 1942
Soviet officers at dinner in a village near Moscow. Winter 1941 - 1942
Soviet armored vehicles BA-10A (the first armored vehicle in the column) and BA-6 are moving into combat positions. Winter 1941 - 1942
A group of German soldiers captured during the Battle of Moscow. Winter 1941 -1942
German units in one of the occupied settlements near Moscow. On the road there is a StuG III Ausf B self-propelled gun, in the background there are Sd.Kfz.222 armored vehicles. December 1941.
A Soviet sentry at a railway siding recaptured from the Germans. In the snow are the bodies of killed German soldiers.
German soldiers, including wounded, captured by the Red Army during the winter offensive of 1941-1942. Noteworthy is the almost complete absence of winter clothing among the Germans.
German soldiers captured near Moscow.
Artillerymen from the French Legion of Volunteers against Bolshevism (Légion des Volontaires Français contre le Bolchévisme, LVF, a French unit in the German army) at a 37-mm anti-tank gun 3.7 cm PaK 35/36 near Moscow.
Soviet armor-piercing soldiers fight in the winter of 1942. The soldiers are armed with a single-shot anti-tank rifle designed by V.A. Degtyarev PTRD-41.
Cavalrymen of the 2nd Guards Corps of Major General L.M. Dovatora pass through a village in the Moscow region. The author's title of the photo is “Advancement of the cavalry to the front line of the enemy for attack.”
A captured 150-mm self-propelled gun siG 33 (sf) based on the Pz.I Ausf B tank (Bison self-propelled gun). Western Front.
Soviet repairmen inspect an abandoned Pz.Kpfw tank. III from the 10th Panzer Division of the Wehrmacht. Moscow region, January 1942.
A Soviet soldier next to a destroyed German Pz.Kpfw.III tank in the village of Kamenka. The tank belonged to the 5th German Tank Division (5.Pz.Div.), which had the tactical sign of a yellow oblique cross in a black square, and was captured by units of the Soviet 7th Guards Rifle Division.
Two German soldiers captured near Maloyaroslavets, escorted by a Red Army soldier.
Soviet intelligence officers at Yasnaya Polyana. Counteroffensive near Moscow.
Soviet artillerymen with a 45-mm anti-tank gun.